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may invade that Island of ours, than that we should be able to subdue them?

The Probability of our fucceeding against Martinico is still stronger against us, if it be true, as I take upon me to fay it is, that the French are able to arm 40000 good Men, in Defence of that valuable Ifland. There is not one acquainted with the vaft Superiority of the French in those Parts, that wonders not they had not invaded our Leeward Islands, fince this War, and that fcruples to own, they might, the two first Years of it, have ruin'd all those Islands in a Fortnight. There is no Difputing that they had Force enough at Martinico only, to do the Work; nor can they ever want it when inclined; or fear fucceeding, if the Superiority of our naval Force, don't prove the Safety of our Fellow-Subjects in those Parts.

The French, 'tis true, have a few more fmall Sugar Iflands, fuch as Guardeloupe and Mariegallante; but they, if conquered, would be but a poor Equivalent for the Continuance of an expensive and unfuccessful War. And I am not clear, that we could fubdue even these small Colonies with all our Maritime Force, confidering how populous and well fortified they are, the Weakness of our contiguous Colonies in Men capable of bearing Arms, and their Distance from this Center of our Force and Power.

Hence, Sir, you may perceive how very wide our Author fhoots off the Mark, in fuppofing we