

object of that bill was to exclude from Parliament all subordinate officers of the Government, all indeed, who were not liable to be driven from office by a vote of the House of Assembly. The fact that this bill was introduced by the late Ministry ought to be sufficient to convince you that they had no desire to purchase parliamentary support—unless, indeed, it be called purchasing parliamentary support to administer the Government in such a manner as will be satisfactory to the people and their representatives. I am sure, gentlemen, that you will think I have said enough on this subject; but as I am anxious to convince you that the views of the late Ministry with regard to the distribution of patronage, are strictly in accordance with English practice, I shall copy an extract from the work of a very celebrated writer on Political Economy, Professor McCulloch. In an article on the Constitution and Government of England, the following passage occurs:

*From McCulloch's Geographical Dictionary.—Article on "England and Wales."—Constitution and Government.*

"Not only are the Legislative measures proposed by the Crown and conduct of the internal Government of the country, and its foreign relations with other States entrusted to Ministers, but they have also the disposal of all, or by far the greater part of the patronage belonging to the Crown. Offices involving no political responsibility, such as those of the household, have been sometimes exempted from this rule, and left to be filled up by the Sovereign according to his personal predilections, but this is not by any means an uniform practice, and Ministers have repeatedly required and obtained the disposal of these offices."

"Generally speaking, patronage in a country like England, is always exercised with a view to the acquiring or preserving Parliamentary support. Napoleon, the King of Prussia, and the Emperors of Austria and Russia might select individuals to fill offices on the sole ground of their superior fitness to discharge their duties. But in a free country suitability for office is *not the only thing to be attended to* in deciding as to the comparative claims of candidates for official preferment: if they possess it so much the better; but the primary consideration is, how is the government to be carried on? Now that, it is plain, will be best effected by securing the active support of the friends of Government and by weakening the party of their opponents; and the distribution of patronage is one of the principal means by which these objects are to be realized. A government that would neglect to avail itself of this power *could not long exist*. Hence in England, nine out of every ten situations are disposed of, on the recommendation of persons possessed of Parliamentary influence. This in fact is here the *via regia* to preferment and state distinction. In filling up the conspicuous situations, the talents and acquirements of the Candidates, as well as their recommendations must necessarily be taken into account; but in the great majority of cases parliamentary patronage is the *sine qua non*. Were the Government more popular than it is, this result would be still more apparent. A man of ability in Prussia without connections, has a much better chance of getting on if he devote himself to the public service than in England; but at the same time the chances of such a person being advanced are infinitely greater here than in the United States. In the latter, every thing is sacrificed to party consi-