

It is also of course desirable that the new Commission should not degenerate into a propaganda forum, and that it should not have to go over once again all the old and discredited charges made against effective proposals for atomic energy control and prohibition during the past five years. We want our new Commission to go forward, not to go backward or to be vitiated by fighting again over all the old propaganda grounds of the unhappy past.

We should also, I think, all agree that one matter which the new Commission should arrange to deal with from the beginning, is the question of a census of armaments, and that this census must include provision for verification and checking, on a continuing basis. And in this connection, I suggest a census could be worked out including the question which seems to arise in certain quarters of military, naval and air bases: military, naval and air bases set up in one country after agreement with another country, in the territory of that country including, if you like, the United States bases in my own country, in Canada, under joint control, and including, of course, Soviet bases in Czechoslovakia and Poland that could be dealt with as part of the census duties of our proposed Commission. There does not seem to me to be any point in making an extravagant bogey-man of this question. Agreement that the question of an armed census must be dealt with at the beginning need not, of course, imply that consideration of other important questions should be postponed. The Commission will, I think, have full powers to create its own committees which will work simultaneously on certain aspects of the overall problem. Decisions on these details can well be left to the Commission itself.

There is another point on which I think we can all - or almost all - agree. This is that the question of confidence lies at the root of effective disarmament. As Mr. Acheson pointed out effectively the other day unless the governments of the world can be convinced that their disarmament will not be unilateral, they dare not disarm. But this question of confidence is the most difficult of all questions with which we have to grapple. The vicious circle of fear, as I ventured to suggest in my statement last week in the General Assembly, is now complete - and we must find a way to break through. For this reason paper agreements to disarm are not enough. It is, for instance, impossible to take very seriously resolutions which state that within a given time we will all reduce our armaments by a given fraction. Apart from the fact that it is quite impossible to reduce armaments when there is no agreement as to exactly what armaments are being reduced, paper declarations of this kind can only be accepted if and when there is complete confidence that they will be carried out. If such confidence now existed between all states, there would not be any swollen armaments which required reduction. We would have reached the millennium.

Therefore, in a world in which such confidence does not exist, the crux of the matter lies in effective guarantees to ensure that any commitments undertaken will be honoured; in effective controls which will give to all parties the assurance that other governments, as well as their own, will carry through any treaty which is negotiated. It would be quite impossible for governments which are responsible for the security of their states and their people to accept any undertaking to disarm merely on the strength of unilateral statements from other governments that they too will disarm.