is little room for non-traditional actors in those regions. Europe offers a more traditional hope for diversification, but the rhetoric of increased links between Canada and the EU leads rarely to concrete measures. Europe's future is in Europe. The Free Trade Areas of the Americas offers a potential avenue for economic diversification, but if justifications for, and trends from NAFTA are any indicator, the FTAA will offer Canada little in the way of new important markets. Since NAFTA came on line, exports to Mexico have increased from .5% of overall exports, to .67%. Hardly a viable option.

So, if this is the case, the US is the sole viable option for Canada in economic relations. How does one balance our interests then, when issues such as perimeter security, agricultural subsidies, and the infamous softwood lumber conflict threaten our economic security at home and abroad? Canada has traditionally looked to multilateral institutions, such as the GATT/WTO, NAFTA, and APEC in order to balance the overwhelming power that the US has over Canada. But Canada does not look to these institutions for the good of an open and liberal international trading regime, as was popular to argue in the post-war, Cold War era. Rather, we balance through multilateral institutions in order to gain leverage in our bandwagoning relationship with the US. NAFTA was a way to strengthen and protect our priviledged access to the US. The GATT/WTO was and is used (and flaunted) when it benefits Canada's trading relationship with the US. The FTAA will be negotiated not to broaden Canada's trading horizons in Latin America and the Caribbean, but to protect Canada's priviledged access to US markets. Again, in the economic sphere, as in the security sphere, Canada naturally bandwagons with the US in substance, but to either protect its market access or to gain leverage over US trade policy, balances in rhetoric, using multilateral trading organizations to strengthen its position vis-à-vis Washington. Canada bandwagons, but with every intention to do so on its own terms.

## Conclusion

Is bandwagoning Canada's best policy option? Should it not be more explicitly balancing the US in the international system? Are not states that are threatened supposed to balance? If we look at economic relations with the US, there is a direct threat to our economic security. Is not Canada's national security and sovereignty threatened by policies such as NORTHCOM and a focus on harmonizing perimeter security and immigration policies? Does not Canada's lack of military resources at home and alliance partners abroad (less so in the security sphere, more so economically) leave it exposed to the power of the US, both economically and militarily? Classical balance of power theory would argue that Canada needs to balance in a context such as this. But it doesn't. Canada bandwagons. Why? Because Canada thinks it can bandwagon on its own terms. Is this constructive? Does this work? It would seem that policy makers believe it does. Canada formulates its policies vis-à-vis the US believing that it can influence the US, and gain leverage, through balancing rhetoric and multilateralism. It has worked somewhat in the past. But is it the best long term goal, given the increasing challenge the US poses to Canadian security and sovereignty under the present regime in Washington?