

profits by pursuit of new investment opportunities. A pro-active sanction would include a tax on financial transactions, and a ban on state sponsored credits.

In effect, a sanction which constituted a tax on trade with an offending state would depart from the concept of crime, punishment and deterrence of crime and replace it with the concept of wardship in which governments defaulting in their duty to the international community would be deprived of a measure of control over their budgets. Their own tax base would be cut back by the tax placed on their trade by the United Nations, their credit would be damaged, and the money generated by the tax would be used to support programmes outside their country which could be directly contradictory to their objectives, and certainly would not be priorities they recognized. In some circumstances, the target government might even find it expedient to permit the United Nations to fund projects inside its own borders that would address problems created by its own actions or neglect. The system would not depend upon the decisions of the target government acting under pressure. This direct action of the United Nations to address the problem would take the place of fuller-scope coercion.

Paradoxically, the avoidance of histrionic efforts at coercion could increase the effective coercive force and at the same time smooth the way for compliance by the target government. Influence for change could increase, not only because the target government would be subjected to less humiliation, but also because it would have less reason to hope it could out-last the will of the world community to impose the sanction. Trade is not a philanthropic activity but one of mutual benefit. Pro-active sanctions which stimulated some diversion of trade away from the target government would not be seen as being as mutually disadvantageous and could, therefore, be more clearly effective. It would be easier to sustain the sanctions regime for long enough that its punitive value would be established.

The lessons learnt in World War One about methods of enforcement, and reinforced by more recent experience, are applicable to a system of pro-active sanctions. The difficulty of enforcement, however, would be minimized because trade would be deflected rather than more fully or completely blocked. It would be possible for the tax system to be tailor-made to minimize its negative impact. The United Nations could order members to collect a tax on trade equal to an agreed proportion of the total value of that nation's import and export trade with the target state, leaving it to members to determine how the tax was applied. In this way, members could favour the least robust parts of their own economies, and extract the revenue from those parts most able to bear the load, or most able to employ the tax revenue to develop new enterprises which would carry out the United Nations agenda.