

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

However, the response to them should be different from that recommended by the authors of this document. If a State begins to experience material or technical difficulties in the process of destroying its stocks, it should be granted assistance in order to ensure compliance with the schedule of destruction.

It is another matter when a State refuses to continue destroying the stocks. This is a flagrant violation of the convention, with all the consequences that follow. This problem should be solved by creating an effective mechanism which would ensure compliance with the convention.

Let us suppose, finally, that a State possessing chemical weapons withdraws from the convention and unfreezes its chemical weapon stocks. This will result in an exceptional situation. The paradox of the French proposal, however, lies in the fact that while calling for equal security for States parties to the convention, it may objectively increase the likelihood that such an exceptional situation will arise because the number of States possessing chemical weapons will grow after the convention enters into force. It is one thing when all chemical weapon production facilities are closed and secured, and quite another when even one such facility remains. On the basis of this facility and its infrastructure it will be an easy and rapid task to exceed the limits of "security stocks". Hence, the dangerous consequences of a State's withdrawal from the convention will also increase, since it will possess not only reactivated stocks but also the potential for their rapid build-up, renewal and upgrading.

Approaching the problem of chemical weapons soberly and realistically, one should proceed from the fact that there are States which possess such weapons and States which do not. As was shown above, the conclusion of a convention should eliminate this difference, and this would happen immediately after the convention enters into force. However, document CD/757 is based on the premise that the status quo existing before the convention enters into force can be changed to the advantage of those States that do not possess chemical weapons or would like to increase their stocks, with all the dangerous consequences I have already mentioned.

The French document, in our opinion, runs counter to the essence and spirit of the convention being prepared and the entire consensus approach in chemical disarmament. I will not even mention the fact that the approach contained in this document would seriously hamper the monitoring of chemical weapon stocks. In the final analysis, a contradictory scheme for the legitimizing of chemical weapon industries -- and the most dangerous aspects of them -- is placed in opposition to the concept of consistent chemical weapons elimination.

As a result, not only will there not be an increase in confidence among the parties to the convention, but new sources of concern will appear which may divide the States that have signed the convention. In our view this cannot either ensure security for the parties to the convention, nor encourage them to join it on a large scale.