

the parties; (C) intercepting unauthorized personnel and equipment from the limited forces zones; (D) observing and inspecting the equipment and troops of the parties; (E) monitoring the transfers of military equipment into zones of limitation as well as their withdrawal; (F) monitoring installations and movements of ground vehicles, aircraft and people; and, (G) investigating allegations about threatening actions by the parties toward each other, including preparatory actions or build-ups.

The parties understood the technical limits of the verification system (i.e., it was complementary to, but not a substitute for, national intelligence) and the kinds of specific information it could and could not provide. When specific concerns arose about compliance, procedures such as using the Joint Commission could be followed to reassure the parties.

- xviii) The verification system was technology-intensive and highly innovative. In order to operate with a minimum of personnel, without sacrificing efficiency or effectiveness, the SFM (with a maximum allowable staff of 200) exploited and refined the application of short-range and remote sensing technology. By employing proven technology, one person located at a monitoring facility could "watch" a border or an area that otherwise would require a substantial force to patrol. When an apparent intrusion was detected, a small reaction team could be dispatched to investigate the incident.³⁸

- xix) The verification system was flexible insofar as its mission could be modified to reflect inspection and compliance requirements in new agreements. Since the SFM already had the full support of the parties in fulfilling its early warning responsibilities, it was not difficult, when circumstances changed, for the SFM to sustain its existing operations and modify its role in accordance with the new inspection and compliance requirements posed by the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty.

- xx) The technical infrastructure of the verification system (sensor and communication systems) and its associated personnel were not subject to interference or counter-measures. Over the course of the six years in which the verification system operated in the Sinai, no intentional efforts were made to interfere with its operation. Egypt, Israel, the United States and the UNEF were all keen to ensure the success of the verification enterprise.

³⁸ It is a principal argument of this paper that technology-intensive verification methods can reduce manpower requirements significantly and thereby ease concerns regarding intrusiveness and sovereignty. The question then arises, why, after the Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai — with the SFM verification system apparently working so well — did the parties opt for a return to the more traditional kind of multinational peacekeeping requiring much greater manpower and heightened visibility on Egyptian territory? It is possible to speculate that with the full return of the Sinai to

Egypt under a formal peace treaty, the political and symbolic qualities of verification now assumed greater importance than the technical and innovative requirements of verification. With both parties placing so much at risk in signing the Treaty, it was incumbent on Egypt, Israel and the United States (in the absence of UN involvement) to demonstrate as much wide-ranging political support for the new Treaty as possible. Within this context, the MFO would appear to fulfil an important political/symbolic requirement beyond verifying compliance with the Peace Treaty.

