

therefore reduce the number of challenge inspections. However, the continuous presence of the human intelligence in the form of an inspection team will not be obviated by even the most sophisticated monitoring regime. Verification would be greatly simplified if this style of control were implemented.

In summary, my delegation is suggesting that the process of destruction should be controlled by a centralized computer facility. To be effective this will require that the maximum amount of information regarding stockpiles and facilities be available when the programmes are written.

In conclusion, the Australian delegation wishes to emphasize and recognize that the tasks of monitoring of destruction and the verification of compliance of a convention are extremely complex ones. It is essential that we meet the challenge and seek practical solutions. Our intervention will, we hope, provide a basis for discussion of some aspects of these tasks. We can make progress through constructive dialogue on these and other issues.

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The problem of verification is obviously a key issue. Here, as elsewhere, as regards verification, a subject which is inherent in all disarmament negotiations, the difficulty is to reconcile the situation of an open society, such as ours, with the situation of a closed society, that of the Eastern countries. We all know that there is virtually no possibility that a serious violation of the convention would not immediately be detected in our Western societies. On the contrary, the secrecy characteristic of the Eastern countries warrants suspecting the worst as much as hoping for the best: however, we must concern ourselves with the worst-case hypothesis. When the security of our States and the freedom of our citizens are at stake, we must be able to guarantee to our peoples that the other party has, without any possible doubt, performed to the letter the obligations it has undertaken, and that the two situations are symmetrical as regards security.

I should like to add here that the quotation which our colleague from Czechoslovakia has just made from General Rogers' statement did not seem to me to be complete. General Rogers, whose statement I read but do not have before my eyes, pointed out that if the negotiations on a chemical-weapons ban failed, it was necessary for the Atlantic Command also to have modern chemical weapons. I do not think that he went beyond that. He adopted the pessimistic hypothesis that our negotiations might fail.

The convention on chemical weapons must therefore have effective verification machinery. Such machinery must operate on two levels. The first is that of systematic on-site international verification: this concerns the entire process of elimination of stocks of chemical weapons and chemical weapon production facilities. It is also necessary, with different modalities, to ensure that chemical weapons are not produced in civilian industry. So far the negotiations have only seriously tackled the question of the verification of the elimination of stocks of chemical weapons. I believe that it is high time that the other two aspects of the problem were also tackled.

The second concerns verification in case of suspicion or complaint by one State party with regard to another. There is no question, in our opinion, of impinging on the national sovereignty of States by providing for a system of verification at will, in which States would have immediately to submit, without argument, to arbitrary checks dreamed up by meddlesome inspectors. It will be necessary to establish objective conditions, time periods, and prior consultations to be specified in the current negotiations. We must also be aware that the final consequence of a refusal of international on-site inspection (a refusal, and therefore a hypothesis, that cannot be ruled out) at the request of the