

are clearly finite and are already stretched almost to the breaking point, on areas such as a Chemical Weapons Convention, where we are slowly but surely progressing and where virtually the entire international community of sovereign states has specifically requested that we redouble our efforts.

### **We should spend more of our time on areas where we are progressing**

For these same reasons, Mr. Chairman, I also share Ambassador Von Stulpnagel's reservations about any possible expansion in the number of items with which we are seized. No doubt there are other subjects of importance to which the Conference on Disarmament could give attention; but not, I would suggest, until we have been successful in disposing of at least some of those already on our plates.

Now, Mr. President, I would like to address in more detail three among our agenda items which are of particular concern to Canada: items 1, 4 and 5. I shall speak only briefly about item 1, a Nuclear Test Ban. It is a subject where the views of all among us have already been clearly stated; moreover, it is one where responsibility for real movement forward lies ultimately with the nuclear weapons states. It is they who must be persuaded that a regime providing for a comprehensive ban on testing can be in their own national security interest. They also must have a key role in determining the possibilities for devising verification measures in which we all can have real confidence. To this end, it is important that the bilateral dialogue and joint experimentation on nuclear test verification between the USA and the USSR continue and that it make progress toward further agreed test limitations. In the meantime, other states which strongly favour a comprehensive test ban, such as Canada, must do what they can to advance this process.

One area, in which we have considered for many years that we could make a national contribution of genuine worth, has been the area of verification. This commitment was re-emphasized by the

Government of Canada in December of 1986 when, in response to one of the recommendations in an earlier joint Canadian House of Commons and Senate Committee Report supporting the need for adequate means of verification as a way of pursuing arms control, the Government confirmed that 'through the work of the Verification Research Unit' of the Department of External Affairs it would be 'advancing practical suggestions for verification procedures.' Many of you will already have seen some of the numerous papers and research documents in various fields that we have already produced and circulated to you.

Of particular relevance to our work in relation to agenda item 1 was our participation in the International Seismic Data Exchange experiment that was conducted late in 1984. We followed that up with a workshop on the exchange of Seismic Waveform Data held in Ottawa in October 1986. Since then we have been devoting part of our resources, along with other Canadian governmental agencies, to upgrading and modernizing the Yellowknife Seismic Array, an internationally recognized facility which, when that modernization programme is completed later this year, will constitute a world-class facility which we hope will serve as a prototype for other international stations to be developed to participate in an International Seismic Data Network.

In one of my plenary statements last year, in which I had also referred to the Yellowknife Seismic Array, I mentioned that, in the autumn of this year Canada would be hosting a technical workshop in Yellowknife. Members of the GSE (Group of Seismological Experts) will be invited to the official opening of the Array at that time. The occasion will include reporting on the discussion of Canadian research on nuclear test ban verification, as well as informal discussions of preparations for the forthcoming large-scale data exchange experiment which is being coordinated by the Canadian representative to the GSE. In fact the Canadian representative will be extending the invitation to participants at its present meeting, scheduled from March 16-17.

Mr. Chairman, before leaving the subject of a Comprehensive Test Ban

(CTB), I would be remiss not to say something, also, about the proposal to convene an amending conference of the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), with the objective of somehow finding agreement to convert it into a CTB. Clearly such a conference could be convened (I understand that at least 34 among the required 38 requests have already been received by the depositaries). But to what avail? It is evident that amendment of the PTBT as proposed will not obtain the assent of all three of the nuclear states who are original parties to the Treaty, as required for any amendment to come to effect. Moreover, not all among the present nuclear powers are parties to the treaty. For this and other reasons, including difficult issues such as CTB verification which remain to be resolved, we in Canada, therefore, see little benefit in such an exercise. Further, we remain convinced that direct negotiations constitute the only practical means of achieving a comprehensive, genuinely verifiable test ban. We at the Conference on Disarmament might make our best contribution by reaching agreement on a mandate for establishing an ad hoc Committee. There are practical things we could be doing, and Canada would welcome our beginning to work in this area, on the basis of the suggested mandate in CD/863 of August 23rd, 1988, as proposed by our former colleague, Czechoslovakian Ambassador Vejvoda.

Now, Mr. President, let me turn to our agenda item 5, on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. It seems to us that, in our consideration of item 5 we are perhaps too often overly selective in our focus. Given the importance of the use of space for the present and future development of mankind, it is clearly of particular importance for us to give serious thought to one very broad and somewhat imprecise issue—namely, the relationship between international security, on the one hand, and the uses of space, on the other. Both of the two elements that comprise this relationship deserve greater conceptual thought, as does the relationship itself.

International security in this context relates not only to the absence of weapons as such in outer space. The