

The battery should resist an attack in front as long as it can fire without danger of being captured. It must not shrink from infantry fire, or even from the loss of guns, if the obligation of remaining in its position demands this sacrifice.

During the initiation of the engagement the battery can generally choose its position with the greatest relative freedom, and with reference principally to the effect of its own fire.

In the further progress of the action it must, for the sake of security, close more upon the troops; it must support them in their advance to the attack by firing from positions correspondingly chosen, and, according to circumstances, if its fire would otherwise be hindered, it must accompany them even to the limit of the most effective range of infantry fire.

Positions on the flanks on somewhat advanced points have the greatest advantages, since the range thence is unobstructed, the movements of other troops are not impeded, all parts of the line are swept by fire, and the support of the line is facilitated in the case of sudden flank attacks.

Formations behind other troops with a view to firing at the enemy over their heads at high angle are only to be taken up exceptionally in ground of a terrace like form, and where the position gives a command over the other troops.

There is little or no instruction in our Drill book upon the handling of a battery. It would be well in any future Red book that some principles should be laid down to aid a commander in placing his battery and carrying on the fire.

The instructions for a division and a single battery is followed by the drill of a brigade, which consists of two, three, or four batteries. The principles are the same as those laid down for a single battery, and do not call for any particular remark.

The work we have been noticing contains all that is important in the original, the translator having judiciously committed that which is unimportant. Whether we can avail ourselves of much or little of the Austrian drill, there can be no doubt of the importance of its study to English artillerymen, and we heartily commend Colonel Goodenough's translation to their careful consideration.

OUR MILITIA SYSTEM.

"If," say our Clear Grit Statesmen, "the country is to have perpetual peace through the Treaty of Washington, what necessity is there for any kind of a defence force? Before answering that question it might not be out of place to take a retrospective glance at affairs in a country at one time less likely to require the presence of an armed organization than the Dominion of Canada. From the time of England's cessation of hostilities with the Republic across the border in 1815 the only enemy the United States had, was to be found in the scattered bands of Indians along the western and north-western frontiers. It is true that our cousins had the Burr rebellion as we had the McKenzie fiasco. These risings were insignificant affairs; and after Texas had been stolen from Mexico and California had been secured after the same fashion, there did not appear, in the future, the possibility of danger or the shadow of necessity for an armed force. It was, we are told, a nation of brothers. It was a republic in which but one feeling predominated, and that feeling was of amity between the component parts, and to hand

down to the remotest age a continent swept throughout with the genial zephyrs of christian regard and of brotherly love. We were accustomed to be told from the forum and the pulpit that war was a resort not to be thought of in the economy of a country with universal suffrage; and that peace for all time to come was assured in the purity of thought of the source of all power, the people. The illusion of the great American people suffered a rude shock in the rising of South Carolina; and in the turning of the guns of Sumter upon Federal authority our consins awoke to the consciousness of having made a terrible mistake. In the four years following the memorable events referred to, the people of the Republic more than once found themselves introduced to the horrors of war; and the wounds inflicted by one section upon the other are not all healed yet.

What has happened in the Republic is so unlikely to happen again; and a war in such close proximity would entail grave responsibilities upon the Dominion. More than this nothing is so certain to provide for internal tranquility as the means to make tranquility certain; and we know of no means to that end, or so likely to prove effectual, as the presence of a body of men who only know duty and to execute that duty. So much may be said in answer to the question of our captious opponents. Our credit in the old world has to be maintained: and making every allowance for the good intentions of neighbors, and with the disposition among ourselves to pursue our way in peace, and to keep faith in respect to all our obligations, still the capitalist of Europe and the intending emigrant has a guarantee in our militia that is not inconsiderable; and not indirectly but directly we have a full return for the outlay of a million dollars spent in preparing young men for whatever contingency may arise. No one will advocate the depletion of the public treasury that an empty parade may be kept up. No one will advocate the waste of time or of money in maintaining what is unnecessary. The difficulty is to determine what force is required, and to make that as efficient as possible, and at the least possible expense. One step in the right direction was the abolition of camps as a yearly feature. But it is not advisable that the force shall come to end like the Yankee's calf that was not killed and did not die but just "g'ien" out.

The latest, indeed the only data as to the cost of our Militia System, is to be found in the Public Accounts; and the document before us only brings us down to 30th June 1872. As the vote for that year and the vote for the year following differed but little, and as the drill was on the same scale, or nearly so, we have authority sufficient for saying that the vote of a million dollars is ample to carry out the programme of present arrangements. It will be found when the cost of transportation and of sustenance at camps are deducted, with such other items as are not features of the Order of May last, that the Commons voted a sum sufficient to clothe and drill for *eight full consecutive days* at Company, or Battalion Headquarters the entire force. The necessary tents and blankets are in store, and beyond the carriage of these to and from points on our railways back to store, the annual drill put in as it should be under canvas, will only cost eight dollars per man and two dollars for each officer; which with a force of say forty thousand men will not be considered a very great waste of money. There is not, we repeat, any necessity for dwelling on the parsimony of the Opposition. It rests with

the Militia authorities to say what force shall be maintained and how. On a future occasion we shall endeavor to point out in what way economy may be judiciously applied, and without in any way militating against the efficacy of the force or interfering with the drill of the men.

CORRESPONDENCE.

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THE UNIFORMS OF THE MILITIA.

PAPER No. 1.

It is a very well known fact that almost every day now, some change or other takes place in the uniform of the British Army—why is no attention paid to it by the Militia Department at Ottawa, so that the Force may derive some benefit (or otherwise) from it? Who is to blame that these several changes are not notified to the militia at large?

On reference to the Army List for September 1872, we find the following order:—
G.O. 71—OFFICERS' DRESS.

(Specially issued, 21st August, 1872.)

I. Her Majesty has been pleased to appoint a scarlet patrol jacket for officers of infantry.

II. The jacket is to be of scarlet cloth or serge, according to the climate, of the same shape and size as the blue patrol jacket, with collars of the regimental facings. The sleeve braided as the shell jacket, according to rank. Scarlet shoulder strap with a small button and the number of the regiment in gold embroidered figures, three quarters of an inch high and half an inch from the lower end of the strap. White cloth edging all round, except the collar and around the shoulder strap. Scarlet lining. Field officers wear gold embroidered collar badges.

III. The scarlet patrol jacket is to be worn without the sash at drill, and on parade when the men are dressed in frocks.

IV. The blue patrol jacket may be worn on regimental boards and on fatigue, stable, or orderly duties, but not on parade.

Officers of line regiments are not obliged to provide themselves with blue patrol jackets, but may wear the scarlet jacket on occasions when the blue is authorized to be worn.

V. A pattern of the scarlet patrol jacket is deposited in the officer's pattern room, Horse Guards, War Office, Pall Mall.

Now, with reference to the above, not the slightest notice has been taken of it by our department, nor did they ever issue an order, i.e. the blue jacket, though nearly every line officer in the force has either a cloth or serge one. The only infantry regiment left in Montreal, have the blue jacket, also a white linen one for summer, and are now getting the scarlet—according to the new