

the jury, and to browbeat and bully the witnesses, and do other things of this kind, if he sees that they please his employer and procure him special retainers?

*Phil.* This is likely enough, Socrates.

*Soc.* And if he sees a witness timid and nervous he will speak to him in a loud voice and try to frighten him, and will treat him roughly, as if he was speaking lies?

*Phil.* We shall not be far wrong, Socrates, in expecting this.

*Soc.* And if he knows anything to the disadvantage of the witness he will rake it up, will he not, however old it may be, and whether it has anything to do with the matter in question or not: as, if a witness is called to prove a will, he will ask him whether he did not once steal apples when he was a boy; and if he knows nothing, he will suggest things which are not true and make innuendoes and insinuations?

*Phil.* This seems his best course, Socrates.

*Soc.* And if the judge interferes or remonstrates he will insult him as far as he dares, or make slighting remarks in an undertone, to make his employer think that he is master in the court and more knowing than the judge?

*Phil.* I should advise him to act so, if he would listen to me.

*Soc.* And thus he will get the reputation of a verdict-winner, and will be talked about in the newspapers, will he not, and will receive retainers and refreshers continually?

*Phil.* No doubt, Socrates.

*Soc.* While the unskilful advocate who asks only relevant questions and is courteous to witnesses and respectful to the judge will be neglected and his fee-book will suffer?

*Phil.* Assuredly, Socrates.

*Soc.* We seem to have arrived at this then, that law is in the nature of a cock-fight, and that the litigant who wishes to succeed must try to get an advocate who is a game bird with the best pluck and the sharpest spurs?

*Phil.* It would be madness not to do so, Socrates.

*Soc.* And to know the law and the true principles of justice will be a matter of secondary importance?

*Phil.* Altogether secondary.

*Soc.* So that we may say that the law is a matter of clever rhetoric and of bullying witnesses and cajoling juries and other such arts, may we not?

*Phil.* Apparently.

*Soc.* Then how shall we reconcile this with the saying of one of the greatest of the wise men, that "law ought to be the leading science in every well-ordered commonwealth"?

*Phil.* We are in a fix, Socrates.

*Soc.* May we not have been wrong in saying that the special excellence of the advocate is to advertise himself and make himself popular with solicitors?

*Phil.* I am inclined to think that we must hark back, Socrates.—*Law Quarterly Review.*