



General Lessard.
Speaking to the troops, Exhibition
Grounds, Toronto.

Souls of the Slain.

Do the birds still follow now
After horses, after plough?
Ploughmen's brothers of the air
Following the keen ploughshare?
We are dead, we know full well,
We are dead and cannot tell.

Do the little children sweet
Crowd around their father's feet?
Are they tossed in glee aloft?
Do they nestle warm and soft?
We are dead, we know full well,
We are dead and cannot tell.

We would like to bend and say
To our children every day,
"How is mother? Does she mind?"
"You must thoughtful be and kind."
We are dead, we know full well,
We are dead, and fighting fell.

We forget the rags and rain,
We forget the pangs and pain,
Let the freedom that we bought
Rest on those for whom we fought.
We are buried, row by row,
We are dead, but we shall know.

—By Gunner John Gurnett.

Browsings Among the Books.

"THE ANGLO-GERMAN PROBLEM."
[A synopsis of "The Anglo-German Problem," by Charles Sarolea; Thomas Nelson & Sons, Publishers, Tyrrell Building, 95-97 King St. East, Toronto.]

On the principle of striking while the iron is hot, dozens of books dealing with the Great War, and written since the fateful 4th of August, 1914, are flooding the market of the booksellers. Practically all of these have been hastily thrown together to meet a demand, although some show the marks of a long previous study of the European situation. Among all, however, whose titles bear upon the stirring questions of the day, none is more worthy of interest than one actually published three years ago, "The Anglo-German Problem," by

Charles Sarolea, D.Ph., D.Litt., F.R.S., a Belgian who is now one of the professors in Edinburgh University. Ostensibly the book was written as the result of a profound study of the whole European situation, but so perspicacious has been the author, and so accurate his forecast of events as they have actually taken place during the past four months, that the work seems almost uncannily of the nature of prophecy; at the same time, in the course of argument, an interesting summary of recent history—of which most people know lamentably little—is presented. Last, but not least, Professor Sarolea indicates how the distressful "problem" may, as he sees it, be finally solved.

The very first sentence of the Introduction, in the light of present events, grips the attention: "Europe is drifting slowly, but steadily, towards an awful catastrophe, which, if it does happen, will throw back civilization for the coming generation, as the war of 1870 threw back civilization for the generation which followed, and which inherited its dire legacy of evil."

From that, the author goes on to show the causes which have brought about so dire a condition—the aggressive Imperialism of Germany, pushed ahead by the "Bundesrat," which controls the Reichstag; international suspicions; feelings of dissatisfaction in France consequent upon the Franco-German War and the taking of Alsace-Lorraine; clashings of commercialism and bitterness over annexations of territory, as when, four years ago, Austria, supported by Germany, annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina; exasperation of Germany at finding herself too late in most of the foreign fields of colonization; the opposition of Slav and Teuton. Sarolea does not blame Nietzsche for the war, although he touches upon him. Nor does he even saddle the responsibility for the military spirit of Germany greatly upon him, nor upon the earlier Treitschke. That, and the tremendous "system" which has re-made Germany into a vast military camp, he lays rather to the credit of Bismarck, and those who with him "saved" Germany, when, forty years ago, the country fell under the political domination of militant and business-like Prussia. To General Bernhardt, however, and his book, "Germany and the Next War," he devotes an entire chapter, evidently considering this Prussian General an exponent of the popular thought of Germany to-day.

Keen is the vision with which Professor Sarolea foresees Germany's first move in the war to come—which has to-day arrived. "With characteristic naivete and insular selfishness," he says, "some jingo imagine that if only the naval armaments of Germany could be stopped, all danger to England would be averted. But surely the greatest danger to England is not the invasion of England; it is the invasion of France and Belgium. For in the case of an invasion of England, even the Germans admit that the probabilities of success would be all against Germany, whilst in the case of an invasion of France, the Germans claim that the probabilities are all in their favor. It is therefore in France and Belgium that the vulnerable point lies, the Achilles heel of the British Empire."—Precisely the mode of attack carried out by the Germans, but the heel of Achilles has not yet been pierced past redemption. "The German navy," he continues, "might eventually be useful to keep England in check, but, after all, the decisive weapon of attack is the German army, and the German people have only been prevented by their Anglophobia and megalomania from seeing this. In the past, the battles of Eng-

land have been mainly fought on the Continent, and so they will be in the future. A crushing defeat of France in the plains of Flanders or Champagne, with the subsequent annexation of Northern Belgium and of Holland, would be a deadly blow to English supremacy. Well may the British people cling to the French entente as a *Versicherungsvertrag*, and the sooner the entente is transformed into an alliance the better for England."

Is it a flash of intuition, too, or hard reasoning which makes the author say, "The war of to-morrow, therefore, will not be like the war of 1870, a war confined to two belligerent forces; it will be a universal European war. Nor will it be a humane war, subject to the rules of international law, and to the decrees of The Hague Tribunal; it will be an inexorable war; or, to use the expression of Von Bernhardt, it will be a 'war to the knife.' Nor will it be decided in a few weeks like the war of 1870: it will involve a long and difficult campaign, or rather a succession of campaigns; it will mean to either side political annihilation or supremacy."

Interesting is the description given of Germany's scheme for expansion to the Eastward, on past Baghdad and to the Persian Gulf, a scheme towards which the building of the Baghdad Railway—unfortunately for Germany, compelled by outside pressure to "end in a desert"—has been but the herald. At some length the author tells of the rapid ascendancy of German influence over the Turks, and here again, he foretells exactly a scheme which Germany seems to be trying to carry out in the present campaign. In substantiation he quotes from Dr. Rohrbach, a German of note. "One factor, and one alone, will determine the possibility of a successful issue for Germany in such a conflict: whether or not we succeed in placing England in a perilous position. A direct attack upon England across the North Sea is out of the question; the prospect of a German invasion of England is a fantastic dream. It is necessary to discover another combination in order to hit England in a vulnerable spot—and here we come to the point where the relationship of Germany to Turkey, and the conditions prevailing in Turkey, become of decisive importance for German foreign policy, based as it now is upon watchfulness in the direction of England."

England can be attacked and mortally wounded by land from Europe only in one place—Egypt. The loss of Egypt would mean for England, not only the end of her dominion over the Suez Canal, and of her connections with India and the Far East, but would probably entail the loss also of her possessions in Central and East Africa. The conquest of Egypt by a Mohammedan Power, like Turkey, would also imperil England's hold over her sixty million Mohammedan subjects in India, besides prejudicing her relations with Afghanistan and Persia. Turkey, however, can never dream of recovering Egypt until she is mistress of a developed railway system in Asia Minor and Syria, and until, through the progress of the Anatolian Railway to Baghdad, she is in a position to withstand an attack by England upon Mesopotamia. The Turkish army must be increased and improved, and progress must be made in her economic and financial position. . . . The stronger Turkey grows, the more dangerous does she become for England. . . . Egypt is a prize which, for Turkey, would be well worth the risk of taking sides with Germany in a war with England. The policy of protecting Turkey, which is now pursued by Germany, has no other object but the desire to effect an insurance against the danger of a war with England."

Beginnings of this policy may be seen

in the developments of the past few weeks, the entrance of Turkey into the war, and the expeditions now en route towards the Suez Canal and Egypt; but the Mohammedan world has not been as responsive as expected. British good government in Egypt has not been without its effect, and, on this 18th of December, word has come that Turkish suzerainty of Egypt is a thing of the past, and that the country along the Nile has passed into the protectorate of Great Britain. . . . The author concludes: "The interests of the German and of the Russian people, as well as their temperaments, continue to be irreconcilable, and the day is drawing near when Russia—which in 1930 will number two hundred millions of people—will block the way of German expansion in the East."—By fifteen years the Russians have anticipated the prophecy of Prof. Sarolea.

The failure of the Socialists in Germany to prevent the military spirit, Professor Sarolea lays to two causes,

(1) the comparative impotence of Socialism in Germany, where even Socialists are peculiarly "law-abiding citizens," (2) to the fact that in that country "hundreds of thousands of citizens who record a Socialist vote are not Socialists at all,"—to vote for Socialism being the only way, though indirect, of voting against the Government. Indeed, he regards the presence of Socialism in Germany as one of the causes that might actually lead to war, since, however mild, there is always the danger that its growth may contain an ultimate threat wherever exists a bureaucracy. "It would scarcely be a paradox to say that the nearer the approach of the Socialistic reign, the greater would be the danger to international peace. German contemporary history illustrates once more a general law of history, that the dread of a civil war is often a direct cause of a foreign war, and that the ruling classes are driven to seek outside a diversion from internal difficulties. Thus political unrest ushered in the wars of the Revolution and the Empire; thus the internal difficulties of Napoleon the Third brought about the Franco-German War; thus the internal upheaval of Russia in our days produced the Russo-Japanese War. . . . It may be true that power is slipping away from the hands of the Prussian Junkertum and the bureaucracy, although Prussian reaction is far stronger than most critics realize. But whether it be strong or weak, one thing is certain, a power which has been supreme for two centuries will not surrender without a struggle. The Prussian Junkers may be politically stupid, but they have not lost the fighting spirit, and they will not give way to the 'mob.' Before Prussian reaction capitulates, it will play its last card and seek salvation in a European conflagration."—Incidentally, as this is in course of being written, the papers are quoting from an article published in Berlin by Herr Liebknecht, Socialist member of the Reichstag, words that, if true, bear out this contention: "This war was not desired by any of the peoples affected, nor was it kindled to promote the welfare of the Germans or any other people. It was created by the common action of the German and Austrian war parties, in the obscurity of self-absolutism and secret diplomacy, in order to anticipate their adversaries. At the same time, the war is a Napoleonic attempt to unnerve and crush the growing labor movement." . . . The recent reported defection of certain officers of the second line of the Landsturm from serving, men between 17 and 45, who, for any reason, have received