

shapes and colours; but
as forms and colours, but
objective sense is nothing
the mind.

and has wisely constituted
formed outward objects
repel these appreciative

uple, of the appreciative
tward forms and colours,
would only be a suitable
s green, red, yellow, etc.,

r arrangement of things
self to the outside object,
ne the one thing excites
ne subjective derelish of

excites the corresponding

must have marked the
ective senses of this kind.
et as well as the novelist,
but to watch the play of

ones of grandeur or sub-
ve no reality in nature,
to excite this class of
ed with the possibility of
otitious conception used
abstratum of the known.
eir historical character;
no stage of existence,

Occurrence.

terable emotion; as, for
desire or aversion; the
or aversion is usually
the "heart." The feel-
re or aversion. Their
on persons. They are
e feelings of conscience.
simultaneously; as, for
oment. They appease
tly, in the continuance
resable do so respon-

the impulse or feeling
se," we mean that the

f the subjective feelings
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sometimes associated, in

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ith our social relations
they are very strongly
et of them are either
impulses are usually

less subservient to the rectoral or subjective feelings of conscience. For these reasons they partake strongly of moral quality. They are excited mostly by the actual knowledge of facts or things, and deal in real verities, rather than mere whimsies of the imagination.

The æsthetic feelings are, as a rule, active only in cultivated minds. The subjective feelings of the Heart are alike strong in both educated and uneducated minds; and, as they concern themselves mainly with our social relations, they constitute, next to those of the conscience, the main sources of human happiness. Their impulses, in our depraved state, very frequently overmaster the subjective feelings of the conscience in their influence on the Will. Had man remained in an unfallen state, it might have been said, "that he that had the conscience had the will." In our present depraved state, "he that has the heart has the will." It is only Divine grace that gives the feelings of the conscience their legitimate mastery in man's nature.

Means Whereby the Subjective Feelings of the "Heart" are excited.

We have already remarked, that every conception contains one or more objects or persons presented in a certain character or relation. The object in this character or relation may be capable of exciting the subjective senses, or it may not. There are comparatively few cases, however, in which it does not excite subjective senses of some kind, which in their turn act powerfully upon the will; and thus they constitute motives or springs of action.

Now, I am so constituted, that when I am brought into personal contact with another person of amiable qualities, it follows, of course, that I perceive or obtain knowledge of this person and his lovable traits of character, which arouse in me the subjective sense of love or friendship. This person is then to my subjective feeling an object of exciting character. It was the knowledge of him in this character, that excited my feeling; and in every act of perception, inception or memory, this person, in this character, stands before my mind, swathed at the same moment with the subjective feeling which the knowledge of him has created.

But objects may excite, not only by their character, but also by their relation. For instance, if I come to know that this person rejects my overtures of friendship with contempt, the knowledge of this fact immediately arouses within me the subjective feeling of indignation; so that at that moment, and even afterwards, while the feeling lasts, whenever he comes cognitively or conceptively before my mind, he stands swathed in the subjective feeling which the knowledge of his attitude or relation towards me has created.

This is a case, in which the object is of exciting relation, rather than of exciting character. It should always be borne in mind, that in strict language, it is not the object alone that excites, but the object in that character or relation; that is, it is the whole conception, not a mere part of it.

Most of the subjective feelings are excited by a single act of knowledge or perception; as, anger, etc. Some, however, of less excitable nature, may require stimulation by repeated acts of perception or knowledge, to fully arouse them, as the feeling of love or friendship, etc. The mind thus acquires familiar or more perfect knowledge of them. In every act of perception, in which the object in exciting character or relation is fully presented to the mind, the whole conception is bathed in all the subjective feeling which it is capable of awakening in that mind. This characteristic of the subjective senses has been so frequently pointed out, that it seems almost unnecessary to reiterate it here.

We need hardly say here, what must be evident to all, that so long as the feeling lasts, the re-perception or remembrance of the exciting conception, always brings it before the mind, flooded by the sentiment which it has aroused.

The highwayman presents himself to the wayfarer, and demands his purse or his life. The knowledge of himself in immediate danger of death, may arouse in the mind of the wayfarer the subjective feeling of fear. In this case, then, the thought of himself in danger of immediate death, is the exciting conception; and the moment it presents itself as a reality to his mind, it ensathes itself with the feeling which it has kindled. The knowledge of the highwayman's act, leads the wayfarer to know, by inception, that he himself is in dangerous relations, which is the true excitant.

In the incident above referred to, however, the wayfarer may have feelings of a different sort. The highwayman, in this offensive relation, may excite in his mind the subjective feeling of combativeness or anger; and his perceptive mind will look at the outside highwayman in this offensive relation, through the halo of subjective feeling which ensathes the robber from the mind itself. Both the robber and the feeling are distinctly perceived, but the one as something outside the mind, the other as a state of the mind itself. We do not perceive the subjective feeling in the outward objective presentation; but the mind, perceptive of its own subjective state, looks at the outward objective presentation.