

economic growth. Plans for (semi-) civilian regimes in Ghana and Nigeria, for three-party competitions in Senegal and Egypt, and for "people's democracies" in Angola and Mozambique are novel variations on the characteristic one-party, or "praetorian", governments already familiar in Africa. In the short-to-medium term, such "constitutional engineering" may be able to contain growing internal inequalities and ideological tensions.

In the longer term, such remedies are unlikely to prevent instability and *coups* unless significant redistribution of resources takes place within some sort of socialist framework. And the pressures for a more radical ideology and structure are likely to grow if the emerging independent states of southern Africa follow the example of Mozambique rather than that of Kenya. The radical grouping in the OAU has been considerably augmented by the independence of Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Angola after lengthy liberation struggles. If the white "siege mentality" now prevalent in the southern part of the continent further delays the transition to majority rule in Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa, the new black governments will tend to favour socialism rather than mixed economies. In view of the substantial economic and military capabilities of these future states, their inclusion in the radical faction of the OAU would have significant implications for the "radicalization" of the continent as a whole.

External violence

At the international level, in contrast to most domestic situations in Africa, conflict has been neither contained nor resolved; indeed, external violence appears to have increased as internal tensions have been restrained. The OAU was designed to maintain order on the continent by recognizing the independence, equality and sovereignty of its members. Moreover, it was intended to advance African unity and autonomy. But the jealousy of new nationalisms has prevented these two sets of goals from being realized. Instead, Africa's consensual foreign policy has tended to dissolve in practice, except at the most general level of rhetoric.

Through the OAU, Africa seeks liberation in southern and northern Africa and development through a "new international order". But, in reality, the "Front-Line States" in the south and the Sadat initiative in the north have tended to undermine continental understandings. The Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe and the Rejectionist Front over Palestine both oppose negotiated "internal" solutions, so dividing the OAU

and the Arab League. The exchange of support over both issues between these two regional organizations and the attempt to equate *apartheid* with Zionism were central themes in the Afro-Arab dialogue. Moreover, OPEC "petro-dollars" could (still) have a profound effect both on economic prospects in Africa and on the Third World position in the debate on a "New International Economic Order". However, the dialogue has floundered somewhat as Arab beneficence has been limited and as political coalitions and ideological divisions have once again cut across the Sahara to link "moderates" and "radicals" throughout the continent. Such divisions have been reinforced by the several conflicts - both bilateral and multilateral - at present raging throughout Africa.

The reappearance of a significant number of bilateral conflicts in Africa is a reflection of growing international inequality and ideological schism. The border fighting and border-closings in East Africa - between Uganda and Kenya and between Tanzania and Kenya - were the visible signs of deep-seated mistrust, envy and disagreement. Kenya, the regional "success story", aroused animosity in Uganda, where Amin's "economic war" had failed, and in a Tanzania suffering from drought and decline. The ideological component was of even greater significance in the bilateral disputes between Egypt and Libya and Sudan and Libya, in which the Gaddafi regime attempted unsuccessfully to undermine the authority and orientation of the Sadat and Numeiri Governments. The continuing Algeria-Morocco tension is also due to ideological differences as well as to conflicting territorial interests. The intensity and frequency of so-called boundary disputes is particularly high along the "southern border" of Africa as both the "Front-Line States" (especially Angola, Zambia and Mozambique) and the liberation movements attempt to penetrate the remnants of the white laager; in turn, the wagon ring hits back at bases in the black states.

Many of these bilateral disputes are often related to broader regional and extra-regional conflicts and coalitions; and each of the regional conflicts is itself related to other such conflicts. For instance, though the Algeria-Morocco dispute has gone on for over a decade, it has been revived in the mid-1970s because of the Sahara question. The division of the former Spanish Sahara between Morocco and Mauritania was opposed both by Polisario, the Sahraoui liberation movement, and by Algeria, along with a few other Moslem and/or radical regimes. Morocco and Mauritania were, in turn, supported by the majority of OAU members,

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