

litigation, and against her proprietary right and title therein and there-
 to, are untenable at Law, as Defenses ~~by~~ the Crown avowedly and ex-
 clusively pleading on the ground of its own wrong. "The principle on
 " which the plea is predicated is not that the party who invokes it has
 " set up an adverse claim for the period specified in the Statute, but that
 " such adverse claim is accompanied by such invasion of the rights of the
 " opposite party as to give the party a cause of action which, having
 " voluntarily failed to prosecute within the time limited by law, he is
 " presumed to have extinguished or surrendered;" of course this only
 10 avails where the opposite party is under no disability to prosecute and
 there is nothing to prevent his doing so.

The objection has also been taken against the Suppliant that her
 claim had not been prosecuted in the Courts of England or against the
 principal Officers in Ontario. It is elementary to say that these Courts
 have always refused to exercise their jurisdiction in respect of extra ter-
 ritorial lands upon the ground that they could not decree *in rem* nor en-
 force their decree *in rem*. Two old cases are leaders cited by the authors,
 one for a house and land in Philadelphia in the Plantations, and another
 afterwards for a land in Ireland, and more lately in the case of the Peti-
 20 tion of Rights by the Representatives of Colonel By against the Queen,
 instituted on failure of Colonel By's *and their* claim in Ontario against
 the Crown, for the recovery of the identical 110 acres of land set out as
 above for the Rideau Canal. The case was dismissed in England on the
 long recognized ground that the English Courts had no jurisdiction, that
 they had no power to decree for lands in the Colonies, nor could enforce
 their decree there. Holmes *et al vs.* The Queen, 2 J. & H. R., p. 527.
 See also Judgment of V. C., Strong in 20 Grant, Ch. R. of Ontario,
 p. 273, *Supra*.

Laches and delay are pleaded, also as precluding the Suppliant in
 30 Equity. It may be sufficient to answer that the disability to sue the
 Crown by a subject subsisted in Upper Canada, now Ontario, during all
 the time from the passing of the Rideau Canal Act in 1827 and previous-
 ly thereto, to the passing of the Petition of Right Act in 1876, which
 alone caused the preclusion referred to. In addition, it may be stated,
 that the said William MacQueen at the passing of the Vesting Act in
 1843, was residing out of Canada and abroad, where he died in 1845,
 that the Suppliant was then a minor also residing abroad, but at her
 coming of age a Memorial of Claim was presented by the Suppliant to
 the Governor-in-Council praying for the restoration of the said lands in
 40 litigation, and by Order-in-Council of the 11th of January, 1869, her
 petition was not entertained, which however did not preclude her right
 to proceed at Law when the said disability was removed in 1876, and her