

federal presence. But the growing federal aid program seemed to make a difference in Canada's status. At Niamey in March 1970, there was only one federal presence, though the French Government lobbied hard for separate Quebec representation. The refusal of African delegates to support the French position is perhaps one indication of their desire to see an alternative to France in the African development assistance arena. Canada agreed to cover 33 per cent of the initial costs of the newly-established Agence de Co-opération Culturelle et Technique and a Quebec journalist who had previously advocated Quebec's own participation in development assistance was named the first Secretary-General of the organization.

### Clear link

It is in the case of Canada's relations with *francophone* Africa that we can most clearly see the link between domestic political priorities and external policy. The growth in Canadian ties to *francophone* Africa matches almost exactly the rising demands of Quebec within Canada. The use of aid allocations as a weapon in domestic political battles does not give the casual observer much hope for the objectivity of Canadian policy. It does appear, however, that, for the time being at least, Ottawa's use of this weapon, beginning in 1964, has retrieved the initiative from Quebec in relations with the *francophone* developing world.

The fact that domestic political priorities have until very recently had a considerable effect on the direction of Canadian aid allocations is demonstrated, not only by the development of large Commonwealth and *francophone* programs but by the relatively small Latin American program that existed during the past ten years. The United States had been interested since the late 1950s in getting Canada to join regional American organizations. President Kennedy suggested during his 1961 visit to Canada that the time was ripe for Canadian entry to the OAS, but Prime Minister Diefenbaker shied away from what he considered American intrusion in Canadian affairs. In 1964 Canada made a promising beginning in Latin American aid allocations, providing for an annual average of \$10 million to the Inter-American Development Bank. Although Canada had no formal bilateral program for Latin America at that time, this allocation through the multilateral agency was considerably in excess of the \$4 million set aside in 1964 for the *francophone* African program. But, while the latter grew at a rather astonishing rate

(from \$4 million to \$50.78 million in allocations in the first eight years of a serious *francophone* program), the Latin American allocations averaged out over the same period at the same \$10 million.

Enthusiasm for the Latin American program seemed to wane as Canada's federal-provincial battles developed during the Sixties, and as *francophone* aid took on more immediate importance. In 1968, at the height of the Ottawa-Quebec fight for representation in Africa, Prime Minister Trudeau sent a high-level mission to Latin America. But, a year later, while Canada opened new diplomatic missions in *francophone* Africa and even in the Vatican, three missions in Latin America were closed down for reasons of "economy". Latin America simply did not hold as much interest for Canadians and thus had less political merit than did the other aid programs. But, in the year 1972-73, with Quebec feeling more secure in its own position, and with less open rancour between that government and Ottawa, federal authorities could afford to give more attention to Latin America. A real bilateral program was started for the first time and Canada became a full member of the Inter-American Development Bank. Bilateral allocations reached \$7 million by 1974, and Canada was in the process of contributing \$100 million over three years to the IADB. We must, nevertheless, continue to wonder what will become of the Latin American program should relations between Quebec and Ottawa deteriorate.

### Pattern stabilized

Since the creation of CIDA in 1968, the pattern of aid allocations and disbursements seems on the whole to have stabilized. The allocations for the most part continue to increase, with the exception of those to the Caribbean, which have levelled off. But, political points having been made in the past decade on whether or not to establish programs in different areas, the increases may now be seen to have less political significance and more relevance to some of the "objective" criteria currently being promoted in the field of international assistance.

There are several trends and a couple of questions that arise out of a retrospective look at the Canadian international assistance record since 1950. Canadian aid policy is obviously to a great extent a function of domestic political priorities and pressures. Between 1950 and 1969, roughly 80 per cent of total Canadian official development assistance (ODA) was channelled through the Colombo

*Recent growth  
in Canadian aid  
to Latin America*