

policy during the great cultural revolution, except for an obvious lessening of tension. This is largely because they are so occupied with their turmoil at home and, in fact, a lot of their diplomats have been called back for extended—well, it would probably be an euphemism to call it, leave. To me this is not surprising because since 1949 there have been many shifts and fluctuations in Chinese foreign policy, but my feeling is that the basic goals have been constant.

Again, with the certainty of over simplifying, I will list those goals as briefly as I can. First and foremost, possibly, the most immediate goal is that of removing the United States military bases and military, political and economic influences from around their borders. This, to me, is highly understandable. I am not taking sides nor am I saying that the bases should not be there, but it is highly understandable for the Chinese government to feel that there is a very direct and immediate threat to them from the American bases that extend from south Korea and Okinawa all round to Thailand, or wherever bigger bases are being dug. The Chinese are not convinced that the new air strips in Thailand, which can and are taking B-52's, are intended primarily for the war in Viet Nam. They say that these air strips are being dug so that the B-52's can bomb them, and it is impossible to convince them otherwise. I know this because I have tried.

It is as unacceptable to the Chinese to have these bases and this military presence around their borders as it was unacceptable to the United States to have Soviet missiles in Cuba with one obvious difference, and that is that the Chinese at present do not have the might to force the removal of this military presence directly.

I think another goal, and one about which the Chinese are quite clear and open, is to recover in time—I want to stress this because they stress it—the island of Taiwan, or Formosa as we tend to call it in the west, and what they call their lost territories. Regardless of the rights or wrongs of the Formosan or Taiwanese question—and I would add in brackets that my sympathies are with neither the Chinese communists nor the Chinese nationalists but with the native Taiwanese—the Chinese feel very deeply about this. They feel more deeply and much more passionately about Taiwan than they do about the situation in Viet Nam because they regard it, rightly or wrongly, as Chinese territory, and they are determined that it shall be returned. By their lost territories they mean mainly large areas of Soviet Asia and also Hong Kong and Macao, which they say were wrested from a weak and backward China in the last half of the last century by foreign powers whom they call imperialist powers, including Tsarist Russia.

The VICE-CHAIRMAN: Would that include any of the territory formerly called French Indo-China?

Mr. TAYLOR: They have never made any specific reference, to my knowledge, in recent years to such contentious areas as former Indo-China. They have, at the same time, settled their border disputes with areas such as Burma which were at different times, under previous dynasties, under Chinese control of one sort or another. That is all I can say about that.

Another goal which they would never admit to openly, but which I feel sure is a goal of theirs, is to reassert their traditional sway over the countries around