

38. Destruction proposals have been postulated in a number of forums. See, for instance, Douglas Fraser, *Progress in International Efforts to Constrain Light Weapons: A Canadian Perspective*, p.10; and Singh, "Controlling the Spread", Chapter 8 in *Light Weapons and International Security*, p.157
39. Herber Wulf. "The Register as an Instrument for Promoting Restraint and Preventing Conflict", Chapter 12 in *Developing Arms Transparency*, pp. 154-155. Though referring to the UN Register of Conventional Arms, the comments are germane to any arms register. Wulf gives a number of thoughts on the subject of a consultative mechanism's potential tasks and some suggestions as to how this may be accomplished. There is little doubt that such an emotionally-charged issue as light weapons will need some methodology for consultation among its participants on a regular basis.
40. Chambers and Greene, *Five Years and Counting*, pp. 9-11
41. Highly computerized data bases and communications already exist in such organizations as the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), British American Security Information Council (BASIC), Monterey Institute for International Studies, Bradford University and a number of other university and non-governmental organizations, as well as the privately-funded International Institute of Strategic Studies, to name only a few.
42. Goldring, "Developing Transparency and Associated Control Measures for Light Weapons", Chapter 17 in *Developing Arms Transparency*, pp. 225-228
43. The open literature includes: *The Military Balance* produced by the International Institute of Strategic Studies; Jane's Information Group of intelligence publications; the *CIA World Factbook*; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI); and a number of internet sites, some of which are affiliated with the foregoing and a number of other academic institutes such as Bradford University and the Monterey Institute of International Affairs, to name only a few. All the information is in the public domain and some of it is remarkably accurate. The sophisticated facilities available to government intelligence agencies must only increase the amount of precise information obtainable.
44. Chalmers and Greene, *Five Years and Counting*, p.17
45. The CFE Treaty requires hard copy exchange of data. This is normally done in December of each year. After this, working groups form at NATO Headquarters in Brussels and convert the data to electronic format for dissemination on the VERITY computer network. Repeated requests from a number of nations to accept the data initially in electronic format were thwarted because of wrangling over the wording of the treaty.
46. Something of this sort has already happened in that the Verification Implementation Co-ordination Staff at NATO Headquarters, originally charged simply with managing the NATO allies portion of the CFE Treaty first expanded to become the central data and co-ordinating agency for all member nations and then further extended itself to assist in the implementation of