

of ships (e.g., battleships were limited to 35,000 tons and sixteen-inch guns).

Followed by the London Naval Treaties of 1930 and 1936, the Washington Treaty established a fifteen-year "system" that resulted in considerable disarmament, probably saved a good deal of money, and helped improve political relations between the leading naval competitors, at least temporarily (and in the case of Britain and the US, more permanently).

EXISTING CONSTRAINTS ON NAVAL FORCES AND ACTIVITIES

Naval forces were included in the various schemes for general and complete disarmament that were bruited about in the aftermath of World War II. However, they were rarely singled out for special attention by arms control advocates. Nevertheless, many of the bilateral and multilateral agreements negotiated over the past several decades — both regional and global — have indirectly affected naval forces, or the ocean environment in which they operate.

For example, the demilitarization provisions of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty apply to the entire area south of 60 degrees South latitude, including ocean areas, albeit with a proviso safeguarding "the rights...of any State under international law with regard to the high seas within that area." The 1963 Partial Test-Ban Treaty prohibits nuclear testing, among other places, "under water, including territorial waters or high seas." The 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco establishing a Latin American Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone is supposed to apply to an area encompassing large swaths of the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, once it has come into force for all of the states of the region (although the major maritime powers have entered reservations on this point). Finally, the 1971 Seabed Arms Control Treaty prohibits the emplacement of any nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction on the ocean floor beyond a narrow coastal band.

Amphibious troops were included in the provisions of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) concerning the prior notification of major military manoeuvres in Europe. At the Madrid Review Conference of the CSCE in September 1983, the mandate of the subsequent Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CCSBMDE, or the "Stockholm Conference") was agreed to cover "the whole of Europe as well as the adjoining sea area," but with

regard to the latter, to apply only to those naval activities (such as amphibious assault, naval gun fire support, or tactical air strikes ashore) connected to operations on land. The September 1986 Final Document of the Stockholm Conference included a provision requiring 42 days' advance notice of the landing of more than 3,000 amphibious troops, and permitting observation in the case of more than 5,000 troops.

Naval forces generally were excluded from the mandate of the more recent negotiations on reducing conventional forces in Europe (CFE). However, in connection with the signing of the CFE Treaty in November 1990 the two groups of participating states adopted a politically binding declaration limiting the number of "permanently land-based naval combat aircraft" to 430 on each side.

Soviet-American Measures

In 1972, the US-Soviet SALT I Interim Agreement on Offensive Forces froze the number of submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers and modern ballistic missile submarines at the level operational or under construction at the time of its signature, except for a small increment as replacements for older land- or submarine-based launchers. Another product of SALT I, the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, prohibited the development, testing, or deployment of any sea-based ABM systems or components. At the same time, the US and USSR signed a bilateral Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents at Sea (the "INCSEA" Agreement) which sought to establish "rules of the road" for naval units in close proximity to each other, e.g. by prohibiting simulated attacks. The USSR later signed similar agreements with many other Western countries, including Canada.

The SALT II Treaty, signed in 1979 but never ratified, included SLBM launchers in its ceiling of 2,400 on "strategic nuclear delivery vehicles" (SNDVs), as well as SLBMs with multiple warheads (MIRVed) within its sub-limit of 1,200 on MIRVed ballistic missile launchers. The MIRVing of individual SLBMs was capped by limiting their re-entry vehicles to fourteen. SALT II also prohibited so-called "futuristic" systems such as ballistic missiles on surface ships; ballistic or cruise missiles on the seabed, including internal and inland waters; and "heavy" SLBMs (comparable to the largest land-based missiles). A Protocol to the SALT II Treaty, intended to last for three years, prohibited the deployment of long-range cruise missiles on sea-based launchers (SLCMs), as well as the testing of such missiles equipped with MIRVs.