

ventional defence, and (b) the NATO adoption of a manoeuvre-oriented doctrine would be extremely risky, provocative and hazardous.

Implicit in the view of those supporting the positional or more traditional approach is the assumption that the conventional military balance is "close enough" to make a conventional force defence of Western Europe feasible. Logically, a corollary of this view is that Soviet capabilities and doctrine are *not* sufficient to ensure a clear-cut or overwhelming chance of Soviet conventional victory in Europe. If Soviet decision makers share this view *but see no real offensive "counter-threat" to them in the positional, forward defence deployment and doctrine of NATO, there might be a possibility of establishing a doctrinal modus vivendi formalized, perhaps, by a major Constraint CBM regime.* Failing this joint perception of conventional military adequacy and the associated finely balanced relationship between dissimilar doctrines and forces, pressures would exist for the Soviets and NATO to acquire "peace of mind" and flexibility unilaterally. This would then become a classic illustration of another "action-reaction" process.

The alternative point of view in this debate – that existing ideas of forward defence are inad-

equated and that only the capacity to employ a manoeuvre strategy will effectively deter or defeat the Soviets – also employs an assumption about the state of the conventional military balance. This perspective assumes that the balance is seriously in favour of the Soviet Union and that more traditional methods of addressing that imbalance simply will not work. This perspective entails the same assessment – bleak – of Confidence-Building prospects as did the earlier discussion of AirLand Battle and Soviet Operational Manoeuvre Groups.

Again, the principal point to this exercise is to demonstrate – if only in passing – *that different images or models or perspectives of the actual relationship between East and West imply different prospects for Confidence-Building.* This was the basic argument behind the Type One Generic Flaw – inadequate assessments of the "Soviet threat" seriously handicap our understanding of the possibilities for Confidence-Building. *If the CBM literature and Confidence-Building thinking more generally are to improve markedly, they will have to address this fundamental weakness. That can be accomplished only by deliberately integrating into CBM studies thoughtful and sophisticated analyses of Soviet policy, its origins and causes, and the relationship between it and Western policies.*

There are many issues, perspectives and concerns that should be considered in efforts to understand the true possibilities of Confidence-Building. Some of them are associated with but remain distinct from the points discussed above. One relatively discrete subject that should be included in any more ambitious analysis of Confidence-Building is *Surprise Attack.* Contemporary assessments of the problems associated with detecting and reacting "correctly" to surprise attack are particularly germane to the sorts of concerns that are presumed to animate Western thinking in Confidence-Building negotiations. There is occasional reference to the theoretical literature dealing with surprise attack but no serious effort has yet been made to incorporate the

⁹¹ The "debate" began after the 1973 Yom Kippur War "demonstrated" the effectiveness of Precision Guided Munitions. Since then, many analysts have argued for the widescale adoption of Anti-Tank Guided Missiles and various other "high tech force multipliers". This advocacy has, in turn, led to wider considerations of how U.S. and NATO forces ought to be equipped and deployed and what doctrine should guide their operational planning. The current character of this debate between advocates of manoeuvre and those of less adventuresome, positional defences can be gleaned from: John Mearsheimer, "Manoeuvre, Mobile Defence, and the NATO Central Front," *International Security*, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 104-122; John Mearsheimer, "Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly in Central Europe," *International Security*, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 3-39; John Mearsheimer, "The Military Reform Movement: A Critical Assessment," *ORBIS*, vol. 27, no. 2, pp. 285-300; Joshua Epstein, *ORBIS*, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 71-86; Gary L. Guertner, "Nuclear War in Suburbia," *ORBIS*, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 49-69; Richard K. Betts, "Conventional Strategy: New Critics, Old Choices," *International Security*, vol. 7, no. 4 pp. 140-162; Samuel Huntington, "Conventional Deterrence and Conventional Retaliation in Europe" and Fen Osler Hampson, "Groping for Technical Panaceas: The European Conventional Balance and Nuclear Stability," both in *International Security*, Vol. 8, no. 3 (pp. 32-56 and 57-82 respectively). An excellent summary of current issues ("New Directions in Conventional Defence") appears in *Survival*, vol. XXVI, no. 2, pp. 50-78.

