on without "symbols," or how, without making use of the despised intellect and a certain amount of scientific method dependent on it, it is possible to answer questions which Bergson regards as important, such as: What are we? Whence do we arise?

A merely dumb and inarticulate intuition can at best satisfy only the vague cravings of its individual possessor. If it remain incommunicable, it can have no value for knowledge in general; and were we condemned to such a situation, it would be vain for M. Bergson to write and reason about metaphysics and problems of science. And there is besides this an important consideration which makes against the attempt to find in instincts and intuitions the basis of philosophy.

The theoretical understanding of the world, which is the primary aim of philosophy in common with science, is not a matter of great importance to animals, to human savages, or even to practical men (who are for the most part those that practice the errors of their forefathers). It is not likely. therefore, that the quick and rough methods of instinctive or intuitive reactions, which bring out our kinship with remote generations of animal and semi-human ancestors, will here find a suitable field of application. Philosophy and science. so far from showing up our affinity with the biologic past. are, on the contrary, highly civilized pursuits, demanding for their success a liberation from the life of instinct as well as a certain detachment from all mundane hopes and fears. In them rapid and unanalyzed convictions and intuitions are least deserving of acceptance, however comforting or desirable they may appear. Their results, if they can lay claim to being anything more than pleasing dreams, must be tested by methods based on sense-data and logic, which it seems many philosophers, who are either greatly hampered by the traditions of the past or who follow the line of least intellectual resistance, still consider to be synonymous with the logic of Aristotle or, stranger still, with the logic of Hegel.