

the banquet was held, he might have been seen leaving the courts in a hansom at two o'clock. It sometimes happens that the list of cases to be tried in his lordship's court is a very short one—we will not pause to inquire the cause—and that he is able to complete it and leave the courts much earlier than the other judges. Not so, however, on the occasion to which we refer. The court rose in the midst of an important case urgently requiring decision. The writer in the same journal concludes his remarks by drawing a contrast between the present Chief Justice and his predecessor, Lord Cockburn, who, he says, "Never once forgot what was due to the Bar of England, of which in his time he had been the official leader, and of whose high traditions, while himself a barrister, he was never unmindful. I do not believe that in the quarter of a century during which he presided over the Court of Queen's Bench, Cockburn ever once allowed any private engagement, however socially important, to interfere with the punctilious discharge of his public duties at Westminster Hall. I fail to see why Cockburn's immediate successor in the exalted seat of Lord Chief Justice of England should habitually treat the Bar of England with studied disrespect, or subordinate his official to his social life."

We conclude *our* remarks on this subject by returning for a moment to the complaints of our Hamilton brethren (referred to *ante* p. 1). One of them, after stating his view of the grievance, suggests that Parliament should interfere and define the hours of sitting, etc. It would, we think, be more satisfactory to the profession and the public for the presiding judge and the Bar to arrange such matters together, with due regard to the convenience of all, and according to the circumstances of each case. This was done in the days of such men as Robinson, Macaulay, McLean, and Draper. Why not now? Another correspondent writes as follows: "The Bar of this Province has always been loyal to the Bench, and have uniformly treated the judges with the utmost courtesy and respect, and they have a right to be treated properly." The writer did not say "properly," but something much more severe. Judges, however, have no opportunity of making any answer to strictures of this kind; so we take the liberty of substituting an expression which, in our opinion, is quite sufficient for the occasion. We trust that they will not be offended if we suggest to those of them to whom it may apply a little more consideration for the convenience and feelings of others.