

ing or rejecting morality. The gardener desiring fruit upon his apple trees would be foolish indeed to strip off the blossoms. In the same way, if we desire the fruits of righteousness and holiness we must not despise or destroy the blossoms of morality. Do not follow the soldier's example, who, learning that it was the bullet that did the execution, not the gunpowder, proceeded to leave out the powder and put in two bullets instead. On the other hand, a morality that is true to itself cannot be self-sufficient and exclusive of religion, but must culminate in the recognition and adoption of the standpoint of religion. This may be seen by a slight examination of the moralist's own admissions and their implications. The moralist says much about duty and obligation. Sometimes duty is sub-divided into duties we owe ourselves, duties to others and duties to God. If morality excludes religion we must leave out duties to God. But can we fulfil completely duties to ourselves and to others if we make this elimination? Why do we recognize and admit duty to self? The moralist ready to defend his position may reply, "not because of any alien force or arbitrary command." Although some theologians have conceived Divine laws in this external and arbitrary relation to the individual, we may quite well grant what the moralist says and still maintain religion. For the moralist's answer is merely negative, and we require a positive answer. The moralist may attempt to give such answer by saying duty is a reasonable demand. In doing right the individual is acting in a manner that is true and loyal to the deepest significance of his own being. He may quote the poet's words :

"To thine ownself be true,
And it must follow, as the night the
day,
Thou canst not then be false to any
man."

The poet's statement suggests a further truth that a man cannot be quite true to himself without including proper relations to other selves, to give content and significance to the life and conduct of the individual.

Now, if we carefully examine the implications of the moralist's admissions, we may discover that he is really claiming that we should adopt and act in accordance with those principles and in those ways that tend to produce, express, develop and realize the most perfect self-hood ; the truest personality. It is evident that this implies that the real goal and ultimate standard of all right conduct is conformity to the character of a perfect person. The whole position rests upon an implicit respect and reverence for the claims of perfect personality. But who is the perfect person? When the moralist can answer this question without referring to God then possibly he may have a kind of morality that does not involve a religious aspect.

Of course it is true that there may be earlier and later stages in moral growth, and there may be a genuine and honest respect for moral laws without an explicit recognition of the Divine Person. But the earnest and sincere moralist who becomes explicitly aware of the just and reasonable claims of the Divine Person cannot consistently ignore or repudiate these claims.

It is not meant in speaking of earlier and later stages that morality grows like a plant. Morality does not "grow of itself," still less does it "grow" into religion, for moral advance demands a spiritual self-expression on the part of the individual, a willing and chosen subordination of the individual likes and dislikes to some conceived higher way of thinking, living and acting. And when the claims of the Divine Person become consciously recognized, a moral act,