

lar army of France, the blue-clad Canadians, the bands of Indians in their war-paint and feathers, all hurried and excited by their rapid march and by the danger which had so unexpectedly burst upon them. Now the evils of a divided command were apparent. Vaudreuil countermanded Montcalm's orders for the advance of the left of the army, as he feared that the English might make a descent upon Beauport.

Nor was the garrison of Quebec available, for Ramesay, its commander, was under the orders of Vaudreuil, and when Montcalm sent to him for twenty-five field-guns from one of its batteries he only sent three, saying that he wanted the rest for his own defense. Montcalm held a council of war with all his officers and determined to attack at once. For this he has been blamed. That he must have fought was certain, for the English in the position which they occupied cut him off from the base of his supplies; but he might have waited for a few hours, and in that time he could have sent messengers and brought up the force of Bougainville, which could have marched by a circuitous route, and have joined him without coming in contact with the English.

Upon the other hand, Montcalm had every reason to believe that the 3500 men he saw before him formed a portion only of the English army, that the rest were still on board the fleet opposite Beauport, and that a delay would bring larger reinforcements to Wolfe than he could himself receive. He was, as we know, mistaken, but his reasoning was sound, and he had all along believed the English army to be far more numerous than it really was.

He was doubtless influenced by the fact that his troops were full of ardor, and that any delay would greatly dispirit the Canadians and Indians. He therefore determined to attack at once. The three field-pieces sent by Ramesay opened fire upon the English line with canister, while 1500 Canadians and Indians crept up among the bushes and knolls and through the cornfield, and opened a heavy fire. Wolfe threw out skirmishers in