

out that the forms of the treaty or treaties and the machinery required to achieve the basic objectives of the Allied Powers could more profitably be discussed after the various delegations had exchanged views on the objectives to be achieved in the peace settlement. In addition to being a perfectly logical suggestion this alteration in the order of business should prevent the discussions from following the rather rigid pattern which has been laid out by Australia, and furthermore should forestall to some extent the possibility that Dr. Evatt might endeavour to "assume" general concurrence in the framework of the peace settlement which the Australian Government will put forward.

8. From the Canadian point of view this revised agenda for the order of business would be particularly appropriate. The Canadian Government is not at present in a position to decide how far it will be prepared to go in participating in the post-treaty control of Japan. Accordingly, it has not been considered appropriate to include in the material prepared for the Canadian delegation to Canberra any fully worked out plan for the long term control of Japan or any specific recommendations for the form of the treaty or treaties required to implement the settlement. Our approach has been rather to indicate the broad objectives which we would like to see the peace settlement achieve and some of our requirements for the protection of special Canadian interests. The order of business of the Canberra conference would be more suitable for our purposes if the basic objectives of the peace settlement were discussed early in the conference. The views expressed by the various delegations should then form a useful background for the discussions on the post-treaty control machinery and the question of whether one instrument or more will be required for the settlement.

9. With the exception of Australia and possibly the United Kingdom it is unlikely that any other Commonwealth nation will be in a position to propose any fully developed plan for the post-treaty control of Japan or to indicate how they expect to participate in such a control system. It will be particularly difficult for South Africa, Burma and Pakistan, whose participation in the initial peace conference and in any system for long term control of Japan is very doubtful, to take part in discussions relating to the form of the Japanese peace treaty and the control machinery required to enforce its terms. It would seem desirable that these Commonwealth countries should be enabled to participate in the Canberra discussions from the outset. This could be accomplished if the basic objectives of the Allied powers were discussed early in the agenda. The alteration in the order of business which has been suggested in the foregoing paragraphs should therefore commend itself to most of the other delegations and their support for such a change might be easily secured, particularly if the advantages were pointed out to them before the Australians propose the adoption of their agenda.

10. With a view to covering all the main subjects of the shorter agenda proposed by Australia the following order of treatment might be suggested:

- (1) Adoption of agenda.
- (2) Procedure: review of United States proposal for a preliminary 11-Power conference.
- (3) Territorial requirements for the peace settlement.