

may be effected by force, and it is important that all the Governments and all the peoples concerned should know exactly where they stand at the moment when any agreed changes begin to be carried out. Such policy as is adopted, however, is on the whole designed not for the present but the future. Whatever danger to world peace may exist it will not be Germany at the time of defeat, when her people are disillusioned and her power gone: it will be one, two, or more decades later when consciousness of defeat turns into zeal for recovery and the scars of war are healed. It will not be when the allied armies are astride a beaten Germany, and behind them peoples who have seen the horrors of Nazi aggression: it will be when a new generation arises that knows not Hitler and confuses humanitarianism with sentimentality.

#### Germany in the European State-system

If there should be, in the post-war world, an effective organization with power to deal with international political questions, the German problems would fit into that larger framework. Such an organization would almost certainly pre-suppose the limitation of national sovereignty, or at least would have at its command force sufficient to make aggression by a single state impossible. Indeed, if there were an international organization of such strength, it must be supposed that the whole character of international relations would be altered. Political boundaries would to some degree lose their controversial character, and in particular would no longer dominate international trade. Nationalism would, in fact, be everywhere in chains.

In such a world German nationalism would presumably decline in strength and certainly as a threat. It would, moreover, be appropriate to deal with Germany on the basis of the common interest without making an absolute distinction between the treatment of that and other countries. Such an eventuality, however, cannot be taken for granted; and, for the time being at least, policy toward Germany must be constructed on the supposition that there will not be an international organization sufficiently advanced to create the stable condition that has been indicated.

Current thinking on the position of Germany in Europe, and in relation to other States in general, remains dominated by considerations of balance. In general it is the view that Germany must not be so strong in relation to other European states that she could again wage aggressive war. It, therefore, becomes necessary to take into account the future of other states as well as that of Germany. The speed and extent of the recovery of France will form a major factor in the balance of power. The Soviet Union will be at the close of the war, and perhaps for some time afterwards, the only Great Power on the continent in a position to act effectively as a Great Power. The U.S.S.R. is, therefore, the obvious weight in the balance against Germany. There are people who feel that her weight, indeed, is too great; and reach the conclusion that Germany must not be weakened to an extent sufficient to throw out the balance in favour of the U.S.S.R. Italy, less than ever, will be able to claim the status of a Great Power. Spain, too, will rank only as a secondary state.

It is clearly a major interest that France should recover her strength as quickly as possible. In the immediate post-war years, however, the only Great Powers on the continent of Europe will be the U.S.S.R. and Germany - the latter to the extent that she is not divided or otherwise reduced in power.