

positive thinking. The first signs that I saw of that were contained in the State Department White Paper of last March which accepted the fact, and the necessity, of social reform in Cuba. It was, unfortunately, largely counter-balanced by the rest of the Paper which contained recommendations for getting rid of Castro and, of course, by the invasion itself. But I think U.S. propaganda units ought to conduct a major campaign to try to convince world opinion, and particularly non-committed opinion, that the U.S. is not opposed to social and economic reform as such, or the right of any country to introduce such reforms

3. I would agree entirely with Mr. Tremblay concerning the ineffectiveness of the U.S. arguments with regard to security, at any rate as far as the non-committed world is concerned. Although the military will no doubt be able to make out a strong case for the need to hold on to Guantánamo, it surely relates to a period when the Panama Canal was of vital necessity to U.S. security, and when this depended primarily on sea power. In any event, whatever the threat posed to the U.S. by a hostile Cuba, this is surely only relevant in the context of a Soviet base or outright defensive pact, and this argument does not look particularly persuasive to the non-committed countries in view of the existence of U.S. bases in Turkey, and the military alliance with Iran. Therefore basing U.S. policy towards Cuba on U.S. security interests seems to me not entirely valid for the U.S. and completely ineffective insofar as the non-committed countries are concerned.

4. In this context I should report a conversation I had just before leaving Belgrade with Assistant Under-Secretary of State Djerdja who said that the relations of Nehru with Tito and Nasser had been rather strained since July of last year, but Nehru had begun to enter wholeheartedly into the spirit of the non-committed group again as a result of the abortive invasion of Cuba. I am sorry I did not have an opportunity to report this earlier, but it does seem to me to point up the importance of a persuasive and effective new U.S. policy towards Cuba if the U.S. is to make headway with the non-committed countries.

5. However, the security of the U.S. is threatened in a much more subtle way than the military threat. I will not attempt to comment here on the danger of Cuba sparking other left-wing anti-American revolutions in Latin America. But Cuba, as either an overt Soviet instrument, or as the tool by which more and more Latin American countries were persuaded in the direction of neutrality, is a far greater danger to the U.S. Apart from the active role to be played by Cuban propagandists, the principal factor as far as non-committed countries are concerned is the picture now implanted in their minds of U.S. aggressive imperialism towards a small neighbouring country. I think it pretty important to try to eradicate this picture.

6. There is also little doubt that the non-committed countries are going to wage a major campaign to wean Latin America away from U.S. dominance and into their "bloc". And U.S.-Cuban relations will certainly play a prominent role in this. If they can be developed satisfactorily, the non-committed will exercise less attraction on the Latin Americans. If the picture of U.S. "imperialism" remains uncorrected, then there will be a strong tendency in Latin America to react against U.S. influence by gravitating towards neutralism.

7. The best way to do this, it seems to me, lies in a clear-cut stand by the U.S. about the social and economic aims of the Cuban revolution and non-interference in the affairs of other hemisphere countries. This would require, I suppose, in addition, a polishing up of U.S.-Cuban relations, if it were to be effective. Probably Mr. Tremblay's suggestion of a deal over the Guantánamo base offers the best hope for progress. My only reservation is that the emotional atmosphere on each side is so over-charged it would be difficult to start negotiations. And it would be pretty difficult to us to propose such a deal to the United States Government.

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