

*Supply—National Defence*

war weapons, especially of so-called deterrence, toward conventional weapons, conventional strength and conventional planning. In other words we should accept the total war stalemate while trying to resolve it by negotiation and reduction of armaments. We should give greater priority to improving the strength and mobility of conventional forces. We should make effective, and not merely talk about it, the concept of balanced collective forces and a co-ordinated program of collective development and production of arms which would really reflect interdependence.

The minister said it this morning, and I have said it more than once when I sat on the other side, that collective security in NATO was based on this principle of balanced collective forces. That certainly was the principle adopted many years ago, but surely the time has come when the strategy and the planning of NATO should reflect that principle more effectively than is the case at the present time. If we cannot effectively work out our arrangements in NATO on that principle, then one of these days, and it will be a great tragedy, NATO will weaken and perhaps even collapse.

What about Canada then? Even on the lowest grounds of national self-interest we should do everything we possibly can to keep NATO active, strong and vigorous; because if it should disappear, what about Canada then? Fortress America or neutralism or what? If the deterrent is largely in the hands of the United States, and it is, and in part also in the hands of the United Kingdom, though there is a debate going on there now whether it should be retained, where does NATO come in, NATO which remains the cornerstone in our system of collective defence though it is being subjected these days to increased national, political and military pressures which may impair its effectiveness?

I certainly believe in NATO as strongly as I ever did. I am talking now about the defence side of things. But here again I suggest that its purposes, plans and methods of defence should be re-examined in the light of new developments. I do not know whether that is being done. We know what the purpose of NATO is. The minister has explained it and other ministers have explained it. It is primarily, I think, to prevent an accident, to remove a temptation, to avoid, above all, having to depend entirely on nuclear retaliation. We know what the nature of this shield is. Its principle is integrated balanced forces, which is insufficiently realized partly because of our reliance on nuclear deterrence and partly because of

[Mr. Pearson.]

a growing national sensitiveness and pride which makes genuine collective control increasingly difficult.

So the question arises, is the shield really NATO—we talk so much about the NATO shield—or is it the strategic air command, which is no more a part of NATO than is NORAD? What is this NATO shield? It is perhaps now only a subsidiary shield but that would not remove its importance even if that were true. The strength of the shield, we are told, and I have never seen these figures controverted, is 21 divisions and effective air forces. On the question of air forces I should like to ask the minister—I brought this up in the house in a question a few days ago—to tell us in the course of the debate what effect the removal of United States squadrons from France would have on the supply and equipment position, the logistic position, of Canadian squadrons which remained in France.

We have been told that the NATO program is now based on a document adopted in December, 1957, dealing with minimum force needs from 1958 to 1963. Writing in the *Financial Post* of last February 7, Mr. Michael Barkway quoted high NATO military authorities as saying with regard to the minimum force needs paper:

For the first time each government now has in front of it a written statement showing precisely what is expected of it. Each can now refer to this annually when it makes up its military budget.

I should like to ask the minister how this program is progressing. Is it up to schedule? I should like to ask him if he can tell us what is Canada's commitment in this five year program. Have we indicated to NATO our acceptance of this five year program and how do we propose to discharge it? Is the Canadian government satisfied with the arms and equipment of its NATO forces?

To return again to the congressional subcommittee, may I point out that General Norstad had this to say on February 19 with respect to the question of the arms and equipment of NATO forces:

Within the NATO forces we are dependent upon atomic forces. We have no forces that are exclusively conventional or non-nuclear.

"No forces", he said.

Within the alliance, the forces which we have are based upon the full exploitation of atomic weapons and new delivery means. Without them they could not deal with a serious situation. When or if strategic air forces would be involved is a matter of writing some ground rules and making a tremendous amount of assumptions. It would be a very "iffy" question and a very "iffy" answer on my part.

I prefer to leave the answer on the basis that if we are to deal with any significant situation we