

*The Budget—Mr. Blackmore*

until midnight. He constrained Chiang to let Chou En-lai have Chihfeng and with it control of Jehol province—Utley, page 12. All that needs to be said now to show the absolute abomination of that act is that the Russians were in control of Chihfeng. Chou En-lai did not have it. He knew he did not have it. He knew the Russians had it, and he used this lying trick to get control of that centre which would have meant victory for Chiang Kai-shek.

The communists in the truce signed on January 10—Utley, page 13—had agreed to allow the nationalists to move into Manchuria to take it over from the Russians—Utley, page 11. But as Russia's armies retreated from the Chinese territory they had ravaged, they handed over the towns and military supplies to the Chinese communists—Utley, pages 12 and 13. Naturally the Chinese nationalists fought. Who would not have fought? Here were the communists breaking their agreement right under Marshall's nose and being disregarded in the process.

When in May Marshall returned from the United States he found in progress a victorious nationalist offensive which was sweeping the communists before it in spite of the Russian arms, military advice, and training that had been given the Chinese communists—Utley, page 13. Marshall, when he returned, saw what was going on and saw that he would have to stop it. Marshall in June again forced Chiang to call a cease-fire—Utley, page 15. This time Marshall made Chiang let the communists keep the parts of Manchuria they then occupied, keep them in violation of Marshall's own truce effective January 13—Utley, page 13. It is almost impossible to believe, Mr. Speaker, that people from the United States would commit such outrages against an innocent people, is it not?

To use Utley's words, "the victorious offensive of the nationalist forces was halted"—Utley, page 13. The nationalists had forced the communists back as far as Harbin—Utley, page 15. That is a long way. You see the terrible loss that was inflicted by Marshall on Chiang then. The communists, having acquired through the second truce the breathing space they required to rally their forces, began to fight against Chiang again. In every case you will notice it was the Chinese communists who took the offensive. They were the aggressors. They continued to fight against Chiang through the summer and fall of 1946—Utley, pages 15 and 16.

Yet the nationalist forces, having still some ammunition left, won battles and regained territory. They captured Kalgan pass, which was vital, and other strategic points in north

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China and seemed well on their way to win the war. I quote from "The China Story", page 16, as follows:

By November, 1946, the white paper on China states, "the government's forces had occupied most of the areas covered by its demands to the Chinese communists in June and during later negotiations and had reached what turned out to be the highest point of its military position after V-J day."

If Marshall had kept his evil hands out of the situation Chiang would have won right then, without any question. Marshall throughout this period kept pressing Chiang—never the communists, always Chiang—for a third truce—Utley, page 16—until finally on November 8, 1946, after a two-day conference with General Marshall, Chiang ordered all his troops to cease fire—Utley, page 16. You will occasionally hear people say that the people of China lost their morale, that they fell away from Chiang in China and that they joined the communists. What kind of story do you suppose would be spread among the ordinary Chinese by the communist liars every time Chiang ceased fire? The story they would tell would be that he had betrayed them. There was no way in which that lie could be answered by Chiang.

The result of these truces was repeatedly to give the communists time to (1) rally and regroup their forces, (2) destroy more and more of China's economic assets and impair Chinese morale, and (3) learn to use the war materials coming from Russia. How vital those things were! The long delay also gave Russia, meanwhile, time to build up a munitions-producing potential in Manchuria ready to supply the Chinese communists with war munitions.

In the light of all that, recall the statement of Acheson that nothing the United States could have done or left undone could have changed the outcome of the civil war in China, and we begin to see the reprehensible and monstrous nature of the lie that Dean Acheson told as the consummation of a chapter of wickedness which I believe for outrageousness probably equalled anything ever committed in the annals of man.

We now come to the second phase of America's betrayal of China in 1946, namely that having to do with arms and ammunition. At the end of July, 1946, Marshall clamped an embargo on the sale of arms and ammunition to China—Utley, page 13—until July, 1947—Utley, page 35. Could you have anything more unjustifiable than to do a thing like that? For almost a year thereafter the Chinese nationalist government was prevented from buying, and was definitely not given, a single round of ammunition—Utley, page 13.