

significant change from what we have at the present time. I repeat, to this point they are not committed to any argument. At the same time, it is a misrepresentation to say that the United States is completely opposed to reprocessing or to fast-breeder reactors.

I might point out that, within recent months, the United States has done a number of things, all of which impacted to some degree on Canadian policy and were part of the whole question of negotiations. First of all, the United States did continue with a high level of research on certain aspects of the matter we have been discussing. The United States resumed shipment of enriched uranium to Europe. The United States provided certain uranium for India, and the United States made an arrangement with Japan so that its pilot reprocessing plant could proceed.

All these things have happened since the original declarations about reprocessing were made, and all came to a head at the London summit, when the energy problem was discussed in all its aspects. As a result of that very thorough discussion and assessment, a decision was made to find out not just what one group or another thinks, not merely to accept the layman's sometimes emotional response, but to have a thorough and complete scientific and other types of assessment of the so-called "full-fuel" cycle.

This decision, taken in May, changed something else. It was concluded initially there, and subsequently by Chancellor Schmidt and our Prime Minister during the Chancellor's visit to Canada, that it ought not to be an assessment confined to the so-called "suppliers' club", or "nuclear club". As a result, INFCE(P) — International Nuclear-Fuel-Cycle Evaluation (Program) — was expanded and invitations extended to other countries, including some in the Eastern bloc — for example, the Soviet Union — and to others such as in Latin America, so that it is much more broadly based. It was, therefore, judged that it would be more credible in terms of its results than if it had simply been the small club of nuclear-suppliers arriving at a conclusion among themselves.

These are the elements, together with these two options, that come into play in our discussions with the Community as to all the circumstances in which we should be prepared to resume shipments. I emphasize that the embargo, now a year old, is beginning to exact very serious penalties and impose heavy strains on our friends in the EEC, who are also our allies, part of the Western Alliance and members of NATO. We can scarcely regard them as being, in such a context, suspect.

Furthermore, bearing in mind what I said about our wish to maintain good relations with Europe, an obstinate and unreasoning resistance on our part to the resumption of shipments would clearly be taken as an unfavourable act; indeed, it has already been so interpreted in some quarters. Yet, at the same time, we were not prepared to negotiate a situation in which the Canadian safeguards were ignored, either in terms of the other elements to which I referred earlier and where there have been significant improvements over the 1959 agreement, or for nuclear supplies without any restraint in terms of reprocessing.