3.2   <u>Multilateral Verification and Arms Control Agreement</u>
       <u>(Continued)</u>

It is possible, however, to envisage other scenarios according to which Paxsat might operate without immediate or formal linkage to a treaty. One would involve the development and deployment of Paxsat in anticipation of an arms control agreement which it could then assist in verifying. It could be argued that this option has several advantages.

(a)   Given the lead time involved in the development and deployment of a satellite verification system, deployment in advance would allow for the immediate utilization of the system once a treaty is signed.

(b)   To the extent that it is accepted that the existence of Paxsat would enhance confidence in treaty adherence, it could be argued that deployment in advance would encourage negotiation of the agreement itself.

Other factors, however, would seem to speak against the viability of this option.

(a)   Unless the system is designed to simply lie dormant pending the signing of an agreement, the same questions concerning what exactly the system is verifying would arise as in the case discussed above.

(b)   It is unlikely that states would consider the expense and effort involved in deploying such a system warranted in the absence of an assured role.

(c)   The optimum technological and operational characteristics of the systems are likely to be dependent on the precise nature of the restrictions embodied in the arms control agreement. Deployment in advance would preclude this design optimization, and might result in a system inappropriate to the agreement.