

capacity of UNAMIR by half.

*UNAMIR could have been supplied with radio jamming and counter propaganda capability to reach the Rwandan people who live in what has been described as a 'radio information culture'. The disinformation campaign by the RG radio station "mille collines" directly called for the killing of Tutsis, encouraged the Hutus to flee RPF territory, and threatened UNAMIR security through several hate campaigns. Why was UNAMIR simply told to go and close down the station?

*Instructions could have been given to all UN staff but in particular UNAMIR, that apparent human rights violations were to be documented and halted if possible. In addition, the public and authorities should have been made fully aware that grave violations of humanitarian or human rights norms would be recorded and acted upon either immediately if possible or in the fullness of time eg. international tribunals

In assessing these different options, it must be remembered that Rwanda is a small country, half the size of Nova Scotia and one-third the size of southern Ireland (average 80 miles north to south, and 100 miles east to west), with a population of 7.2 million. Also, the military forces involved were relatively small (RGF: 15,000 regulars and 20,000 Interahamwe versus RPF: 15,000 max)

Even within this limited 'what-if' scenario and in light of Operation Turquoise, almost universal reaction was that tens of thousands of lives would have most certainly been saved during the massacres. Such an ongoing UNAMIR presence would also have made it operationally easier and thus possibly more acceptable politically, to increase the size and mandate of UNAMIR at an earlier juncture. There is also almost certainty that the steps set out above in the scenario would have reduced the refugee flow so as to indirectly save lives and avoid massive economic dislocation. In addition, with reduced refugee flows, the overall cost savings for UNHCR and others appears obvious.

Many people feel that the obvious confusion in and around UNAMIR during that first month, combined with an obvious concentration on getting foreign nationals to safety, only reinforced the perception of the RG and RGF that they could operate with impunity. Observers felt that the Hutu extremists concluded that the world community was not particularly watching what they did, and did not really care about what happened to Rwandan peasants. The Rwandan ruling élite both Hutu and Tutsi had demonstrably proven over the centuries and in the previous three years of the on again off again civil war that the lot of the peasant majority was of minimal concern to them. They naturally assumed that the rest of the world felt the same, and the actions of the UNAMIR and the UN at large during that first month did little to dispel that view.

Butare was a case scenario. For the first two weeks, the civil authorities ensured that the situation remained calm. This was well known by UNAMIR as they still had a military presence in Butare, and it is reported that the Préfet asked for a greater UNAMIR presence to avoid destabilization