

arms, machine guns, grenades, land mines, artillery, shoulder-fired anti-tank weapons, and other forms of man- and truck-portable weapons" (p. 377). The article is divided into five sections.

Part I examines the relationship between arms and conflict. Arms can play one of three roles in internal conflict:

- 1) they can be the proximate cause (i.e., one side arms, causing the other side to carry out a preemptive strike);
- 2) they can be the permissive cause (i.e., weapons exacerbate an existing conflict);
- 3) they can determine the duration and intensity of the conflict.

Part II focuses on the changing patterns of arms supply. The post Cold War arms market is weighted in the buyers' favour in two respects: overproduction capacity and stockpiles of surplus weapons. The result has been an intense competition for arms contracts to employ surplus production capacity. Sales to unstable areas, the resurgence of the black market in weapons, and a decline in the capacity of supplier states to regulate their trade, have followed.

Part III discusses two ways to manipulate the trade in light weapons to resolve internal conflicts: imposition of arms embargoes, and strategic manipulation of weapons supplies. Unfortunately, the illegal market and existing stockpiles of weapons diminish the effectiveness of both of these strategies. Easy access to large numbers of small arms must be curtailed to enable the strategic manipulation of arms.

Part IV posits three initiatives to manage and control the light weapons trade. First, tighten national controls over light weapons transfers to curtail the black market. Second, expand the scope of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms to include light weapons. Third, develop an early warning system for internal conflicts (to include information on patterns of arms purchases, types of deployments, and the formation, training, arming and activities of militia groups).

Part V argues that confidence and security building measures are essential to diminishing the scope and severity of internal conflicts. Two options are examined: coercive (e.g., Somalia) and cooperative (e.g., Haiti) disarmament. Spear maintains that neither option has been completely successful in the past, but efforts must continue.

628. Ukwall-Uebelhart, Barbara, Andrei Raevsky and Jakkie Potgieter. *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Geneva)*. New York and Geneva: United Nations, 1996.

This report is divided into three parts. Part I is a case study of disarmament efforts in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. It details the background to the conflict, and the role of UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Force) in brokering a peace plan. The focus, however, is on disarmament. This paper "...proposes to review the problems that UNPROFOR encountered in carrying out its mandate, to analyze the failures and successes of its disarmament operations and to assess the contributions of disarmament towards confidence building and conflict resolution" (p. 5). The fundamental argument is that disarmament was a critical factor in the success of the peacekeeping operation. A chapter is devoted both to the UN mission in Croatia and to the one in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In these two chapters, "...an attempt will be made to show the relationship between, and the evolution of, the events, the mandate, and the implementation of the mandate with particular emphasis on its disarmament components" (p. 6). The next three chapters each focus on specific disarmament operations (Sector West around the border between Bosnia and Croatia, Srebrenica, and Croatia) "...with a view toward identifying commonalities and the pertinence of the UNPROFOR model for other disarmament operations" (p. 7).

It is emphasized that disarmament was achieved "...during the presence of a real or perceived superior UNPROFOR strength, and with a credible threat of forceful implementation" (p. 152). For disarmament efforts to be effective, the multinational force must adequately address the security concerns of all parties involved. Two key elements must both be present for success: "(1) a mutually acceptable agreement which met the parties' interest; and, (2) the credible threat, or use, or force to compel the implementation of the agreement" (p. 153).

Part II is a bibliography. Part III duplicates the responses to a questionnaire of the role of UNPROFOR.