

Specific Measures to Control Conventional Proliferation

A wide range of specific measures can be proposed to deal with various aspects of the problem of conventional proliferation. These can be broken into three categories: transparency measures, supply-side measures, and "mixed" (supply and demand side) measures. Transparency measures, in particular those that concentrate on the expansion of the UN register of Conventional Arms, are discussed in the companion report by Edward Laurance, and will not be discussed in this report. Pure "demand" side measures will also not be discussed, in part because these fall under the heading of "regional arms control" measures, and in part because arms suppliers will inevitably have to be involved in the development of such measures, to guarantee or enforce such agreements among weapons recipients (making these "mixed" measures).

The measures outlined below are not mutually exclusive, and the most credible and appropriate strategy will likely be a "basket approach," that incorporates different measures to deal with particular elements of the proliferation problem. It is unlikely, however, that these various measures can be "stitched together" into a comprehensive conventional non-proliferation regime, for several reasons.³⁹

- the vast differences in the regional scope of the problem make global measures difficult;
- the wide variety of weapons systems and technologies that could be dealt with make single approaches too complex;
- the shifting coalition of suppliers that would be needed for specific concrete measures work against a single umbrella regime;
- the potential for "negative linkage," where a failure to achieve progress in one area undermined the entire non-proliferation edifice, mitigates against a comprehensive approach.

On the other hand, some sort of unifying conceptual architecture to inform policy initiatives is probably essential. Such an approach is provided, for example, by the concept of "cooperative security" that has been elaborated in Ashton Carter's, William Perry's and John Steinbrunner's discussion of *A New Concept of Cooperative Security*.⁴⁰ Their suggested underlying principle to lie

³⁹ On various ways of integrating "export control" systems, see Leonard Spector and Virginia Foran, *Preventing Weapons Proliferation: Should the Regimes be Combined?*, a conference report of the 33rd Strategy for Peace and U.S. Foreign Policy Conference, October 1992, cited in Gary K. Bertsch and Richard T. Cupitt, "Non-Proliferation in the 1990s: Enhancing International Cooperation on Export Controls," *The Washington Quarterly*, 16:4 (1993), 38.

⁴⁰ (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1992). William Perry is the Secretary of Defense in the Clinton Administration; Ashton Carter is the Assistant Secretary of Defence for Nuclear Security and Counter-Proliferation. It should be noted that this is *not* the same as the concept of "cooperative security" that has been elaborated and promoted