seen whether the same lesson will be applied to the conventional field, where reductions could have an even greater impact on defence budgets.

An effective global ban on chemical weapons (CW) will similarly tax Western negotiating ingenuity. While the recent US decision to produce a new binary CW may strengthen the West's hand, very difficult problems of verification, which go well beyond those negotiated for INF, remain.

The next major US arms control goal is a 50 per cent reduction in strategic nuclear forces. In the strategic arms reduction talks (START) the basic framework has now been established, and an agreement to drastically reduce offensive arms seems possible, if the relationship to defensive concepts, in particular space-based defence, can be satisfactorily resolved. At a minimum, agreement on development and testing to be permitted under the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and its duration for such purposes, will be necessary. However, serious dialogue on strategic defence, both within the Alliance and between the superpowers, has barely begun. In Europe, as in Canada, there is considerable unease about the implications of the SDI notwithstanding the technological participation of a number of governments in the research programme. As reassurance the allies can be expected to ask for confirmation of the approach agreed by President Reagan and Prime Minister Thatcher in December 1984, to the effect that the deployment of any new BMD system would be a matter for agreement in NATO and negotiation with the Soviet Union.

Long-range cruise missiles add another dimension to the arms control challenge in the future, including from the viewpoint of North American defence. The prospect of future BMD deployment is likely to accelerate development and deployment of ALCMs and SLCMs. More broadly, given the