

Sheridan's newly-arrived force of three divisions of mounted infantry to aid Grant's left in forcing his adversary's extreme right. In consequence of this rapid movement the Confederates were completely overweighed at the point selected for the attack, and their works were actually pierced, rifle in hand, by the dismounted horsemen. And these American troops were but rude men at arms as compared with the army of the cavaliers which Colonel Chesney suggested as a possibility worth considering in the future. It is remarkable that the lecturer did not use the very obvious confirmation of his theory which may be found in the saying of the same General Sheridan when in France in 1870. Some of Friday's audience were no doubt surprised at the audacity which could even imagine that the operations of an ordinary modern army of 300,000 soldiers could be effectually paralysed by one of 30,000 vigorous horsemen. Yet this is just what Sheridan is known to have openly declared that he himself could have done against the investors of Paris with three times the force of mounted rifle men he led from the Shenandoah to Grant's aid five years before.

This is by far the truer way of looking at the matter, and, with all deference to His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge, we do not think much more of his objections on the score of expense, and the difficulty of transport for such an Army, than of the remarks of our leading contemporary. Take the history of the Fourth Cavalry Division, which played a distinct part in the war of 1870, under the command of Prince Albert of Prussia. This force consisted of six regiments, the 5th Carriassiers, the 1st, 6th, and 10th Uhlans, and the 2nd and 11th Hussars, formed into three brigades, numbering in all about 3600 men. After junction at Weissenburg, it was sent (August 5) in pursuit of the enemy, and on the night of the 6th it marched against the fugitives from Wörth, and followed them up for thirty hours. On the morning of the 8th, having cut the line of railways east of Saverne, and occupied the whole district from the Palatiné to the Vosges, it bivouacked amid a storm of rain, and after a few hours' rest, under conditions most trying to men and horses, it pushed forward again, heading the Eleventh Army Corps, and after having held Marsal for a few hours on the 13th it reached Nancy on the 14th, being always two days' march ahead of the Army, which it kept fully supplied with intelligence often of the highest importance. From Nancy forwards, when the Third Army started for Chalons, the division acted as *avant garde*, and cleared the way over a belt of country so wide that it was bounded on the north by Bar-le-Duc and on the south by Joinville; the cavalry marking out the route for the army, and frequently engaging the enemy. This, we are aware, is only a striking instance of the efficient action of a small body of cavalry as an adjunct to a moving mass of infantry: but it is highly suggestive of the perfection, in cavalry movement, to which the arm may be brought, and of the capability of a body of cavalry, specially organized for the purpose, as Colonel Chesney suggests, performing an important part in any future continental war. It is certain that such a force of cavalry would have succeeded in sweeping the country all around Paris, to the distance of nearly a hundred miles, which was ravaged by the Duke of Mcklenburg's army, clear of the enemy. It would have prevented the junction with that force of the army of Prince Frederick Charles

before Orleans. It would have saved the army of Faidherbe, and we may take General Sherman's word for it, it would have bent up the quarters of the investing army under the walls of Paris.

On the whole, therefore, we are inclined to think that Colonel Chesney's suggestions are worthy of the most serious consideration, if England is not prepared to see herself "effaced" on the continent. There may be difficulties, which some may think almost insurmountable. Such, for example, as the transport of many thousands of horses, and the points alluded to by His Royal Highness the Commander in Chief. But the present difficulty of placing a sufficient number of British infantry on any continental battle-field to take part with which the nation either would or ought to be satisfied, far exceeds these difficulties in gravity. No doubt "it would be a sad business, as the leading journal presumes, if we are to incur the trouble and expense of reconstructing our Army on the new model, only to find it incapable of sufficient action, either in an enemy's country or in our own." But we do not understand that Colonel Chesney proposes any such rash proceeding. If England were ever invaded, a force of 20,000 cavalry would find plenty of work to do at home, and the fact of its being trained in the manner suggested by Colonel Chesney would only make it the fitter for that work, while it would be available also for foreign service in the event of our engaging in operations of war on the continent. The proposal, therefore, as we understand it, is to double the number of our present cavalry, and, at the same time, organize the whole cavalry force afresh, on the principles suggested. This is not exactly a parallel case to the reconstruction of the Navy by the substitution of ironclads for the old three deckers, nor do we see that the country would run a too formidable risk on the score of expense, in experimentalising on the creation of such an arm. Would it not be a reasonable course to appoint a conference of officers to consider Colonel Chesney's suggestions, and elicit further information, both from that distinguished officer and from other competent authorities in matters of detail.—*Broad Arrow*, April 14

### PREPARATION FOR WAR.

Accepting as an axiom the proposition that preparation for war is the best guarantee for the maintenance of peace, it is obvious that the question how to prepare for war in the most efficient and economical manner becomes at once one of paramount national importance. It is, however, a very large question, more especially for a maritime Power like England, which boasts an Empire on which the sun never sets, a Power which consequently must be prepared to wage war either by land or sea in any quarter of the globe. The scientific study for the subject has hitherto—as we shall see presently—been almost entirely neglected in this country, and it may, therefore, be well to examine briefly the fundamental principles which should guide us in such an important matter.

In the first place, however, we must clearly understand what is meant by being prepared for war. For there is, unfortunately, a pretty widespread idea that such a condition implies that the defensive establishments of the country are on a war footing, but this, we need hardly say, is a most erroneous conception. A nation may be said to be prepared for war when she

can mobilise effective establishments, proportionate to the fighting strength of the country, with sufficient rapidity to meet any possible war emergency. In time of peace fleets and armies are of very little use, and, indeed, it will be sufficiently accurate to assume at present that they are only required for war purposes. Accordingly, the maintenance of naval and military establishments entails upon the country an enormous expenditure which is almost entirely wasted, unless the desired end, preparedness for war is attained. There is, unfortunately, no blinking this fact. Gallant officers, in returning thanks for the Services at civic banquets, sometimes endeavour to commend the profession of arms to the mercantile mind by humorously styling the Army and Navy Estimates an insurance premium, paid by the nation to secure its commercial and industrial wealth. Now, although this conception is more strictly accurate than is sometimes the case with post prandial ideas, yet there is some practical danger in the metaphor itself, because it is naturally apt to engender the notion—especially in the minds of those business men to whom it is usually addressed—that we can "partially insure"; that is to say, that a small Army and Navy afford a certain amount of protection, and that as we gradually increase our defensive establishments—we add a ship or two to the Navy, or a few battalions to the Army—so do we increase our preparedness for war. Now, this is a great mistake. A nation is either prepared for war, or she is not; for if she is but imperfectly prepared—as France was four years ago—she cannot be regarded as really prepared for war at all. This is, in fact, the bitter lesson which the French have learned from their late unsuccessful contest with Germany, and it is one to which we in England would also do well to take heed. Considering, however, the vast expense incurred by the maintenance of naval and military establishments, and their uselessness in time of peace, the grand aim of the statesmen, in endeavouring efficiently and economically to prepare his country for war, should be simply to provide the means of mobilising the requisite men and materiel with the necessary rapidity, dispensing with them as much as possible in time of peace.

This statement may appear to some a mere platitude, and perhaps it is so; nevertheless, when we examine matters a little more closely it will be seen that not only has the English Government never thoroughly recognized and acted on this simple principle, but that there is as yet actually no Government machinery in existence in this country capable of dealing properly with the matter in this way. For, in consequence of the insular position of Great Britain, it is inevitable that our base of operations in a foreign war must always be a seaport; while in the event of being invaded, our first point attacked must likewise be a place on the seacoast. Hence it is evident, that for the proper conduct of the operations of war we in England ought to have a closer connection and a more harmonious co-operation between our naval and military establishments than is required by any other civilized nation on the face of the earth—unless, indeed, we choose to except the Japanese. But what is the actual state of matters? The War Office, instead of being, as it ought to be in the country, a department including or at least controlling, both an Army Office and a Navy Office (or Admiralty), is a purely military institution; and therefore, as appears