

CONCLUSION

62. Of the various precedents and procedural suggestions for the conclusion of the Peace Treaty for Japan examined in the foregoing sections, the United States proposal for a series of conferences composed of representatives of the eleven States Members of the Far Eastern Commission which would reach decisions by a two-thirds majority vote would appear most likely to serve Canadian interests and should therefore, be supported. The opportunity to participate on a basis of equality with other Allies most directly concerned in the preparation of the Japanese Settlement is a procedure which was denied to Canada and Allies not Members of the Council of Foreign Ministers in the conclusion of Peace Treaties with the ex-Axis satellite states in Europe and so far, at least, in the Settlement with Germany. The proposal that drafting of the treaty should be conducted under two-thirds majority rule, should make it impossible for the Soviet Union or for that matter any other great power to block progress in the completion of the Japanese Treaty as was the case with previous settlements.

63. It is worth noting that a two-thirds majority rule in an eleven-member conference would give to the Commonwealth, as a whole, a veto over the proceedings of the conference, provided the various Commonwealths were to vote as a bloc. This aspect of the voting procedure must already have been considered by the United States authorities who would seem to have something to lose under such a plan. However, if the United States Government is prepared to face this possibility, there would seem no reason for the Canadian Government to suggest any alteration in the two-thirds rule. Both Canada and the United Kingdom, have made it amply clear that they do not subscribe to the "one-voice" approach by the Commonwealth in international affairs. Any danger therefore of this eventuality is probably unreal.

64. In the event that the United States Government and other Governments concerned are not prepared to proceed with the treaty preparation without the Soviet Union, it may become necessary for some compromise to be reached with the Soviet authorities in order to assure their participation. If this eventuality occurs, the Canadian delegation should seek maximum participation in the preparation of the settlement consonant with agreement amongst the Great Powers. It may be necessary, for instance, to agree to the granting of a limited veto to the Great Powers for use only as regards certain clearly defined subjects of the settlement. These might include, for instance, territorial changes which have already been agreed by the Great Powers.