The United Nations cannot, of course, force the Soviet Union to pay; we cannot, so to speak, put our hand in the Russian till. But if the Soviet Union persists in rejecting the principle of collective responsibility, persists in refusing to pay "one kopeck" towards its accounts, then, in our view, the General Assembly has no option but to invoke the Charter sanction against non-payment of duly assessed shares.

Let us be clear that this is not a prospect which any country relishes. One does not talk idly of depriving any nation of its vote. We are not inflexible nor do we wish to be unduly legalistic. There are several alternatives open to the Soviet Union and it is still my hope that it will choose one of them to fulfil its responsibilities as an important founder member of the United Nations.

The maintenance of peace and security may well be a costly matter. We must not forget, however, that that cost is infinitesimal in comparison with the benefits which peace and security bring in their wake. Moreover, the issue is not a simple one of money, important as that is. What is at stake is the principle of collective responsibility and the very future of the organization on which we have built our aspirations for a peaceful world. If we are to permit governments a free choice of paying or not paying for duly authorized peace-keeping operations, then it is obvious that we will have dangerously weakened the capacity of the United Nations to respond to future emergencies.

Looking at the past, with its sorry history "of drift, of improvisation, of ad hoc solutions, of reliance on the generosity of the few rather than the collective responsibility of all", we must plan more judiciously for the future. It is imperative that we agree on long-term arrangements to cover the financing of future peace-keeping operations which will command the widest possible measure of support. For our part, we believe an essential ingredient will be a special scale of assessments for peace keeping which will acknowledge not only the collective responsibility of all but also the fact that the capacity to pay of many countries -- and I have in mind particularly the developing countries -- is limited. I am also attracted by the proposal that there should be a special committee set up to make all future recommendations on possible methods of peace-keeping financing. Here we are in an area where fruitful negotiation should be possible. Certainly, we cannot much longer proceed on the present unsatisfactory basis.

If I have painted a rather sombre picture, it has not been in any mood of despair or alarm. What I have sought to do is to put into proper perspective the issues which underlie the present debate. I am still hopeful that, with the requisite patience and determination, we can fashion peace-keeping machinery which will vindicate our belief that the United Nations can be an instrument capable, in the words of the Charter, of saving "succeeding generations from the scourge of war".

Here, then, are two of the major problems confronting the United Nations on the eve of its twentieth anniversary. They are serious problems and they will need to be faced. But the viability of the United Nations cannot, of course, be assessed simply in terms of the problems it has not yet managed to solve. Indeed, these problems themselves are symptomatic of the