

Trudeau's foreign-policy review produced in the end a slip-cased set of six colourful booklets, *Foreign Policy for Canadians*. Canada's national interest was considered paramount, with foreign policy defined as "the extension abroad of national policies," which were listed as social justice, economic growth, and quality of life. A general booklet was accompanied by separate studies on Europe, the Pacific, Latin America, the UN, and international development. Critics scorned the absence of a booklet on the most important subject of all, Canada's relations with the United States. The critics included Pearson himself, who was appalled by what he saw as the replacement of constructive international engagement by narrow national self-interest.

The Department also lost status in the world of bureaucratic Ottawa. Trudeau implemented an elaborate system of Cabinet committees, which brought foreign policy into a much more interdepartmental context. Interdepartmental consultation greatly increased, especially in areas that had important international dimensions but were also of great significance domestically, such as the environment. The Department found it difficult to adjust to this system, and annoyed the Prime Minister by being too slow and too wordy in the documentation it submitted to him.

Trudeau at first relied far more heavily for foreign-policy advice on his legislative assistant, Ivan Head, than he did on the Department. A former foreign-service officer and academic, Head travelled abroad with Trudeau, briefed the Prime Minister before meetings with foreign leaders, and accompanied him to those meetings. He generally functioned as a source of advice and information that was independent of the Department and as Trudeau's agent outside the normal diplomatic channels. He had access to foreign leaders and their top aides, such as Henry Kissinger, adviser to

President Richard Nixon. Although Head kept the minister informed of his activities, the Department viewed him as a competing source of advice whose quality they could not assess.

Perhaps more important, the government was also determined to consolidate the foreign service. Michael Pitfield, the assistant secretary to the Cabinet, established a task force in 1969 to bring about the integration of foreign operations abroad. This in turn led to the creation of the Interdepartmental Committee on External Relations (ICER), chaired by the under-secretary, to shepherd the integration process. It was clear that in the government's eyes the promotion of trade was to be a very high priority abroad, and that officers from the Trade Commissioner Service, long treated as the poorer cousin to the foreign service, would now have a much-improved chance of becoming a head of post.

Although support services abroad were integrated, ICER accomplished little else. Any prospect that External Affairs might seize control of the coordination of foreign policy was obviated by the foot-dragging of the other departments involved. In fact, other departments and agencies, such as the successor to the External Aid Office, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and Energy, Mines and Resources in the increasingly important area of energy policy, strengthened their own roles perceptibly.

With the appointment of Allan Gotlieb as under-secretary in 1977, the Department became more aggressive. Gotlieb championed the concept of External Affairs as a central agency of government, one that should play the lead role in international relations. With the support of Trudeau and Pitfield, now clerk of the Privy Council, foreign-service integration was back on track. When the two men returned to power in 1980, after the brief interlude of a Progressive