

the Vienna CSBM Document (from which in fact they were drawn) but this agreement appears to have little to do with meaningful confidence building. That there could be confusion about this only illustrates the absence of sound conceptual work on the confidence building phenomenon.

Overall, however, it was at least helpful to be reminded of the possibility that some historical agreements (and the processes of change associated with them) might demonstrate genuine confidence building characteristics. Important, as well, was the study's identification of a number of then-contemporary non-CSCE/OSCE international arrangements that typically still are considered to be good examples of confidence building.

Key members of this group were United States-Soviet Union strategic nuclear-related confidence building arrangements. One of the best illustrations is the classic US-USSR "Hot Line" Agreement of 1963. Also important are various "Incidents at Sea" agreements. Relevant, as well, are several strategic nuclear force-related arrangements that call upon the superpowers to avoid (or clarify) military activities that might be mistaken for acts of aggression. The 1971 "Accidents Measures" Agreement and the 1988 "Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement" are good examples.<sup>2</sup>

It bears mentioning, however, that the status of these agreements as examples of "genuine" confidence building is uncertain despite a widespread tendency to automatically consider them to be confidence building agreements. It is clear that they contain examples of well-recognized confidence building *measures*, they appear to have been cooperative in character, and there seems to be little of the usual zero-sum motivation seen in other superpower nuclear arms control agreements. However, it is less clear whether these agreements demonstrated the transformation potential that has emerged in recent years as a hallmark of the confidence building process. It is probably more accurate to say that these strategic nuclear-related agreements featured clear-cut CBMs but *might* not be good examples of genuine confidence building because they are: (1) too isolated, constrained, and

idiosyncratic in application; (2) premature in terms of potential supporting background conditions; and (3) part of a security relationship — Soviet-American strategic nuclear relations — that offered very few intrinsic opportunities by its very nature for "real" confidence building compared with conventional force relationships.

These examples illustrate very well the difficult issue of how we should evaluate confidence building efforts. The mere fact that one or more well-recognized CBMs are elements in a bilateral or multilateral agreement does not seem to be sufficient for the agreement to count as a genuine example of confidence building. However, the negotiation process that yields an agreement should possess certain cooperative characteristics and previously-strained relations should improve as a result of the agreement's operation, if the agreement is to be categorized as confidence building. "Spill-over" from the very specific issues covered in an agreement to related security issues is probably another indicator, though significant, across-the-board positive changes are probably not necessary. However, this set of indicators require further analysis and should be explored in new research.

Also instructive in this discussion of contemporary non-CSCE/OSCE examples of confidence building was the fact, discussed briefly in the first study, that a number of what appear to be modest CBMs have been employed in Central and South America over the years as well as in the Middle East.<sup>3</sup>

However, even more so than in the case of strategic nuclear confidence building, it is not entirely clear to what extent any of these actually represent sound examples of confidence building. As in the case of Soviet-American strategic and naval CBMs, it should not be assumed automatically that agreements committing states to use CBM-like measures in Latin America, the Asia-Pacific area, or the Middle East necessarily count as legitimate examples of confidence building as understood in this report. The point here is to distinguish between the simple use of CBM-like