

nowadays rarely confronts the P-5 collectively or individually in the Council.

Some of these recent changes have combined to create a trend towards larger operations. The UN deployed up to 78,000 troops over the period from January 1993 to the middle of 1995 (figures vary month to month, often sharply, as some operations wind down and others start up). The figure as of July 1, 1996 was 26,231 troops, civilian police and military observers deployed around the world, down dramatically from earlier figures for reasons discussed below. The trend towards large-scale involvement started with Namibia, where the UN essentially governed the territory in the year preceding internationally monitored elections, and continued in Cambodia where up to 25,000 UN staff became involved in many aspects of national life. Somalia accounted for up to 32,000 personnel at its peak and the former Yugoslavia up to 45,000.¹⁵

It is also instructive to look into the **composition of these PKOs**, in terms of national profile over this period. Patterns in troop contributing changed.¹⁶ Traditionally at the UN, there had been an understanding that Permanent Members would not provide significant numbers of personnel for PKOs, it being thought that their participation could prove controversial and it being generally accepted that the military forces of middle powers and smaller countries were better trained for the tasks involved.¹⁷ However, with the advent of large-scale UN peacekeeping, the "traditional" troop contributing nations (TCN)s such as the Scandinavians, Australia, Ghana, Fiji, Malaysia and Canada could no longer supply the numbers required. Thus, in the early 1990s, for practical as well as geo-political reasons, P-5 members became leading TCNs. This shift generated anxiety on the part of a number of middle powers, afraid of losing their niche in the peacekeeping field, and created new tensions between TCNs and the Council. These tensions led, as of 1994, to more transparency in the Council's working methods and greater consultation by it of TCNs.¹⁸

¹⁵ These figures cover only military personnel, civilian police and military observers, thus excluding UN Secretariat civilian staff working on human rights, electoral matters, humanitarian relief etc. (These numbers could be sizeable, e.g. nearly 3,000 at their peak in Namibia relative to the roughly 4,500 military and police personnel.) They also exclude the personnel of UN agencies, funds and programs such as UNHCR, UNDP and UNICEF which have played such a major role in overall UN strategies in e.g. the Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Somalia.

¹⁶ For example, On May 31, 1989, the leading troop contributing nations were Finland (1,890), Canada (1,146), Austria (962), Norway (955), United Kingdom (935), Ghana (908) and Malaysia (906); on July 31, 1993, they were France (9,089), Pakistan (6,165), Italy (3,649), United States (3,454), United Kingdom (3,306), Canada (2,939) and India (2,687); These figures drawn from the respective Monthly Summary of Troop Contributions to Peacekeeping Operations issued by the UN.

¹⁷ Exceptions were made where P-5 members had strong ties with, and expertise on, a given theatre of operations, e.g. Southern Lebanon for France, Cyprus for the UK.

¹⁸ More recently, with lower requirements for PKO personnel in 1996, "traditional" peacekeeping nations (e.g. Finland, Norway, Austria, Ghana, Fiji, Nepal, and Canada) are beginning to re-emerge as the leading TCNs.