(including ethnic, religious, linguistic and other inter-group conflicts). These systems, which are arguably the most significant in the contemporary world, include the most basic and low-technology items in the world's arsenals: automatic weapons, man-portable missile launchers, and land mines.

The concept of *constraining* conventional proliferation also captures the analytic thrust of this report. The difference between conventional armaments and weapons of mass destruction is clear. There is a strong normative prohibition against either the possession or use of weapons of mass destruction, and political efforts to constrain them can take their elimination as the ultimate goal. Arms control and disarmament efforts in the nuclear, chemical and biological weapons field are often compared to the struggle to abolish slavery via legislation, and the development of strong global norms.

On the other hand, conventional weapons the trade in conventional weapons is different. It cannot, nor should not, be eliminated entirely; it cannot, nor should not, be uncontrolled. A policy of denial would, among other things, deny the legitimate right of self-defence to states and peoples (as witnessed in the debate over lifting the arms embargo to Bosnia), would push many more states to develop indigenous arms industries, and would entrench an international hierarchy of "haves" and "have nots" which appears highly self-serving to states outside of the Western industrial world. Unilateral and multilateral efforts to constrain conventional proliferation must be developed in a nuanced and complex policy environment. This does not mean that no constraints can be imagined (in fact many are in place), but rather that one goal of multilateral policies must be to build a consensus on the permissible limits of the conventional arms trade: what can be transferred, to whom, and under what circumstances?

Mandate and Scope of this Report

This report has seven broad goals:

1) to examine Canadian security and political (including humanitarian) interests with respect to conventional arms proliferation;

2) to examine global, regional and bilateral efforts to constrain conventional arms proliferation, and to assess the opportunities for, and limitations upon, such efforts;

3) to identify the impact on Canada of support for and participation in efforts to constrain conventional arms proliferation;

4) to identify Canadian strengths and limitations with respect to influencing Canadian efforts to constrain conventional arms proliferation;

5) to review the scope of Canada's production of and trade in arms;

6) to suggest options for Canadian efforts in support of conventional arms non-proliferation;

7) to identify areas for further research.

The chapters that follow are not organized directly along these lines, but each one supplies a particular piece of the conventional proliferation puzzle. Chapter two develops the rational for constraining conventional proliferation in light of the changed security environment, and changed thinking about international security. Chapter three outlines the global political, economic, industrial and technological context for arms production and trade, and sketches the key forces that give rise to arms exports, and which restrict the scope of possible constraint measures. Chapter four focuses directly on Canada's role in constraining conventional proliferation, and its place in the global defence production and trade system. Chapter five shifts the focus to the recipient states, by examining the different consequences of conventional proliferation on regional and internal security, or economic and social development. Chapter six reviews past and present efforts to constraining conventional proliferation. Finally, chapter seven presents a wide menu of options for constraining