

seeing the conflict resolved.

The above represents an ideal situation, one based on Chap. VIII principles of action. However, political inertia, organizational deficiency and institutional rivalry have often prevented such a division of labour from developing in the past. Therefore, taken at face value, the case for improved inter-institutional cooperation appears to be a compelling one. But it should also be recognized that such cooperation may simply not be possible, and maybe not militarily practical or politically advantageous, in all contexts.

Two current examples have highlighted the importance of this issue. The heated debate over UN/NATO 'dual key' arrangements for authorizing airstrikes in support of UNPROFOR illustrates the disconnect that can arise from the UN's quasi-absolute need to maintain political neutrality and the military imperatives of a deteriorating situation on the ground. In the aftermath of the July 1995 London Conference on the situation in Bosnia, considerable confusion arose over the issue of command authority for the launch of NATO airstrikes. Under pressure from the United States and other Western allies to do away with the 'dual key' after the fall of the UN safe areas of Srebrenica and Zepa, the UN Secretary General reluctantly agreed to delegate the authority to sanction airstrikes held by his political representative in the Former Yugoslavia to the overall UN theater commander. A further shift in authority occurred following the UN decision to withdraw from Gorazde when the NATO commander in southern Europe (CINCSOUTH) was discreetly awarded even greater latitude in conducting air strikes. The experience of the preceding two years had demonstrated that the previously adopted coordination arrangements were simply not contributing effectively to the enforcement of Security Council resolutions.¹⁷ Another current example of the importance of the institutional coordination issue is the absence of the Arab League in the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP). It is a telling illustration of how a regional organization is sometime the wrong regional body to solve a problem. In that instance the Arab League – a regional institution which has never had a particularly favourable disposition towards Israel – was widely recognized by all parties as an

¹⁷ By SC Res 836 (4 June 1993) the UN Security Council had decided that Member States, acting nationally or through regional arrangements, might take, under its authority, all necessary measures, through the use of air power, in and around UN safe areas, to support UNPROFOR. SC Res 816 (31 March 1993) had already empowered NATO to enforce a ban on military flights to cover flights by all fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft in the airspace of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the case of the latter it was recognized that operational effectiveness dictated that NATO commanders, rather than the UN, have command authority for air intercepts. On the other hand, the UN insisted that its special representative in the Former Yugoslavia, or in certain cases the Secretary General himself, should have the last word on NATO close air support missions or more important strike missions, rather than UNPROFOR commanders on the ground or NATO military commanders, hence the 'dual key'.