The Verification of ASAT and Space Weapon Limitations

Would a new treaty or agreement dealing specifically with ASATs pose special technical and/or organizational verification difficulties? How would such an agreement interact with existing treaties (such as the ABM Treaty) and possible new multilateral treaties dealing with the non-weaponization of space? Would this potential interaction create unique verification problems or would it simplify the verification task? Does it even make sense to talk about a separate ASAT agreement given the potential coverage of a revised ABM Treaty and a non-weaponization of space agreement?

Would the potential use of exotic technologies in the design of ASAT systems create special verification problems, particularly if the technologies could be seen as dual or multi-purpose and useable in BMD and air defence roles as well? Is there any practical way of dealing with this type of problem?

Would the presumed multilateral nature of an agreement for non-weaponization of space create special verification problems beyond those associated with terrestrial multilateral arms control agreements? Would a special-purpose multilateral verification organization be the only feasible organizational response?

The Verification of New or Non-Traditional Forms of Arms Control and Confidence-building Agreements

Will agreements for maritime arms control and confidence-building include measures that are appreciably different than their ground-based relatives? If so, in what way will they be different? Will they require new approaches to monitoring and verification? Will maritime agreements be served best by unique verification structures and organizations, or can they be integrated into existing or land-oriented organizations? Will maritime regimes operating near or in coastal areas create different needs and problems for verification than open ocean regimes? How will such regimes interact with land-based arms control and confidence-building regimes? Will some regions be more likely to develop maritime-oriented rather than land-oriented arms control and confidence-building agreements, given their geographic circumstances? How will this (and possible cultural factors) affect the design and operation of verification regimes, including possible verification organizations?

How can the co-operative movement toward non- or less-offensive defence regimes be monitored and verified? Are there some approaches to this general objective that will be easier to monitor and verify than others? Should this concern for verification guide the initial efforts to develop "defence transformation" regimes? How might this be done? Is the attempt to move toward defence transformation regimes the most sensible course to pursue, or are there other ways of addressing conventional concerns regarding military stability? Would they be easier to verify?

Does it make sense to talk about monitoring or verification conducted in the absence of or separated from a specific arms control agreement? Are there "verification regimes" that could serve useful purposes even though not formally attached to a specific arms control agreement? Would it be useful to develop a series of regional Open Skies-type monitoring arrangements? Would it be useful to transfer the general notion of stand-alone monitoring or verification regimes to the maritime realm? Should such an effort be confined to surface and air activities or could it also include sub-surface activities? How would these two basic models of "Open Seas" work? How would they interact with existing international legal undertakings and norms? Could this idea be extended to outer space, as well? Do existing efforts to develop global seismic nets to monitor underground nuclear tests fall in this same basic category?

Are there ways of developing verification regimes for use within or in association with "nonco-operative arms control regimes" that