

nature of its negotiating process. The debates in the CD are predicated on the existence and the interplay of interests between three groups (in addition to China) which, as noted earlier, correspond to the major coalitions in international security issues: a Western group composed of member states from NATO, and Australia and Japan; an Eastern group composed of member states from the Warsaw Pact; and the Group of 21, comprising states from among the neutral and non-aligned. Julie Dahlitz has rightly observed that the "prevailing ethos" in the CD is predicated on the interests of these "power blocs," and has asserted further:

Negotiating patterns reveal the presumption by each power block that any negotiating position acceptable to the others is likely to be disadvantageous to itself. Whatever sense there may be of common purpose, to escape the physical danger and economic and social burdens imposed by the nuclear arms race, appears to be outweighed by the presumption of implacable hostility. This could be the paramount reason why the rate of negotiation is so slow.⁵

It is certainly true to say that the arms control diplomacy of Western and Eastern non-nuclear powers must be understood in the final analysis within the contexts of their respective alliance relationships. Similarly, with the exception of Sweden as an anomalous westward leaning neutral state within the Group of 21, the diplomatic behaviour of the members of this group cannot be divorced from the disarmament and development aspirations of the non-aligned movement. It may be that the groups in the CD are better termed "diplomatic" rather than "power" blocs, because the element of "implacable hostility" and the concomitant quest for military advantage which was characteristic of the disarmament negotiations in the intense Cold War years has all but evaporated from contemporary multilateral discussions. But the United States and most certainly the Soviet Union, and perhaps also the leading states of the Group of 21, have continued to place a premium on group cohesion and have, on sensitive issues, treated divergent trends within alliance or group ranks as deviation or defection. And the element of gamesmanship, the quest for propaganda advantage which was characteristic of Cold War

⁵ Julie Dahlitz, *Nuclear Arms Control*, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983, pp. 32-46.