

sia could ease the process by responding to the legitimate security concerns of its neighbours. "Confidence-building is a co-operative effort, requiring a sustained commitment by all four nuclear successor states," said Mrs. McDougall.

She indicated that Canada would be prepared to join an international program to assist the countries of the former Soviet Union in destroying their nuclear weapons. Canada has explored and wishes to continue to examine areas where it can assist with the implementation of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and nuclear safety.

Mrs. McDougall also called on the nuclear-weapon states — which include China, France and the UK as well as the US and Russia — to go beyond "build-down" and provide non-nuclear-weapon states with security guarantees in addition to those implicit in the NPT. ■

Study on Verifying Non-Proliferation

The current restructuring of the international system has had significant effects on verification. As old threats melt away and new security concerns emerge, the process of verifying arms control obligations will have to be increasingly flexible, responsive and cost-effective. While many studies have evaluated specific verification techniques, procedures or agencies, relatively little has been written about the synergies among these processes — that is, about the ways in which operations and data from several sources can combine to produce a result that goes beyond what could be achieved by each of the inputs alone.

EAITC's Verification Research Program recently invited four distinguished scholars to explore the synergistic effects among various methods and approaches to verification. Their report — "Constraining Proliferation: The Role of Verification Synergies" — has been published as the fifth major study in EAITC's *Arms Control Verification Studies* series and is being distributed to libraries and research institutes in Canada and abroad. In addition to evaluating past verification synergies, the authors identify how such effects could be harmonized to enhance verification, particularly in the context of curbs on proliferation. Their report is unique and comprehensive, breaking new conceptual and practical ground. It is also timely in view of the priority assigned by governments, including Canada's, to efforts to deal with proliferation.

Preparing for the NPT Extension Conference

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is the centrepiece of global efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons beyond the five declared nuclear-weapon states (the US, Russia, the UK, France and China). Article X mandates that 25 years after the NPT's entry into force, a conference must be held to decide "whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods." As the NPT entered into force in 1970, the decision will be taken in 1995.

Given its importance to the future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference is already the subject of much national and international attention. A UN General Assembly resolution in the fall of 1992 mandated the formation of a Preparatory Committee for the Conference, open to all NPT parties, with its first meeting to be held in New York from May 10 to 14.

For Canada, the overriding objectives are indefinite extension of the NPT in unamended form and universal accession to the Treaty. In working with other states towards these goals, Canada is emphasizing the need to:

- ensure the continuation of the arms reduction process involving the US and the former Soviet Union. By the same token, accord due recognition to the

- progress that has been achieved;
- shift the focus of attention away from the US and Russia towards the other nuclear-weapon states, and towards the "threshold" and "pariah" states that are seeking nuclear weapons;
- reinforce the absolute essentiality of the NPT, from the standpoint of stemming horizontal proliferation as well as of maintaining the foundation for nuclear commerce;
- seek progress towards a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT), which will improve the climate of the extension process. However, point out that the NPT and a prospective CTBT are separate and distinct issues; and
- create a process for the Preparatory Committee meetings and the 1995 Conference that is clear and unambiguous. This means procedurally separating the decision to extend the NPT from the NPT review process, and from the conclusions at which that process might arrive. Two of the four earlier NPT review conferences did not produce agreed final statements.

To permit independent progress on the two sets of issues at stake in 1995 (extension and review), States Parties should establish a Review Committee and an Extension Committee. The Review Committee should be the umbrella for three sub-com-

mittees: one to review the provisions relating to non-proliferation; a second to review the provisions relating to transfers of technology and peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and a third to review the provisions relating to nuclear-weapon-free zones, disarmament and confidence-building measures. An emphasis on the period since the last Review Conference in 1990, coupled with a review of the preceding five-year periods, seems the most efficient and productive. The mandate of the Extension Committee should be limited strictly to drafting a resolution on whether the Treaty should continue in force indefinitely or be extended for an additional fixed period or periods.

The Preparatory Committee's work should include the preparation and review of papers and other procedural matters. The deliberation of substantive issues should be left to the 1995 Conference. Canada believes that while the Preparatory Committee meetings could take place in Europe, the Extension Conference should be held in New York to ensure the greatest possible attendance. Many smaller states that have UN missions in New York do not have diplomatic representatives in Geneva. Every effort should be made to encourage participation by all States Parties in this decision of utmost importance to the security of all states. ■