

problems of that part of the world. Before the end of the year, however, an agreement had been reached between the people of the Netherlands and the people of Indonesia which gives every evidence of providing a permanent basis of settlement.

In Indonesia, as in the other areas with which the Security Council concerned itself, primary responsibility for working out a settlement rested with the parties themselves. The function of the Security Council was in the first instance to put an end to the fighting and, through the appointment of truce commissions, to assist in preventing a renewal of the conflict. In the course of a political dispute which has become inflamed to the point of violence, it is not easy to keep the peace, even when it has been possible to restore it, and in no case did the truce which the Security Council succeeded in establishing persist without occasional breaches. On the whole, however, it was possible to assist the parties to maintain conditions in which negotiations could proceed. In various ways the Security Council encouraged and facilitated these negotiations. In some cases this assistance was given by providing terms of reference under which the negotiations should proceed, in others by establishing commissions of investigation, or by making possible an exchange of views between the parties, either directly, or through a disinterested third party. In neither Palestine nor Kashmir has this procedure led to results as definitive as in the case of Indonesia. In all three cases, however, the Security Council succeeded in initiating negotiations, conducted in peaceful conditions, which have appeared at the time as the only alternative to general warfare.

The consideration of these items in the Security Council gave particular significance to the two-year term of membership which Canada completed at the end of 1949. During this period, the Canadian Delegation, and through it the Canadian Government, had been involved in decisions of great consequence concerning problems that had not previously been a matter of direct concern to Canada. The Canadian Government had also had an opportunity to study the Security Council at first hand and to consider the methods by which that body could best be put to use in present circumstances. The lessons drawn from this experience were summarized by the Secretary of State for External Affairs in his statement at the opening of the Fourth Session of the General Assembly\*. He said that certain principles had emerged which the Canadian Government regarded as the necessary basis for any action which the Security Council might undertake. His statement continued as follows:

These principles, in default of an improvement in relations between the Communist and democratic worlds, would seem to mark the limits that we can now reach. To attempt to go beyond these limits in present circumstances is merely inviting failure. The first is that the Security Council shall not initiate action that it cannot complete with its present resources. There have often been demands that the Security Council should intervene in some area or another with force, and that when fighting occurs, the Security Council should take steps to suppress it. There would be a great deal to recommend such intervention if it could be carried out firmly and quickly, but the fact is, of course, that the Security Council has at present no effective way of imposing its will. In consequence in many cases it can do little more in the first instance than call upon the parties engaged in the dispute to stop fighting and start talking, offering them the means by which they can work out a settlement by negotiation rather than by conflict. This is not a dramatic or spectacular method of procedure, but in the circumstances it has served fairly well.

The second principle which, in our opinion, should guide the actions of the Security Council is that to the greatest extent possible the responsibility for solving a political problem should be left with the people who are immediately

\*For the full text of the statement, see Appendix 1, pp. 207-212.