

der such circumstances! Is it not certain that we should be promptly informed by the enemy that we must decide at once between the alternatives of Empire or final and complete separation from the British Union? Should we not be justly informed that we must either pull down the British flag or be prepared to resist any attack which might be made upon it on Canadian territory? Should we not be justly told that it was not open to us to occupy the mean and equivocal position of claiming to be a colony of Great Britain protected by British power to-day and of being an independent Kingdom capable of defending ourselves to-morrow? Would this not certainly be the position which any hostile power would take and be amply justified in taking?

And then, again, what of the attitude of Great Britain herself towards the colonial relationship in time of war? If Great Britain decided to occupy Canadian ports or Canadian territory, or to transport men and arms over Canadian routes, how could Canada refuse her? Britain's legal right to do so is beyond the shadow of a doubt. Let us make no mistake! Times of war are very unlike times of peace. Under the stern storm and stress of war nations are usually forced to assert their legal rights. The very suggestion, however, that Canada would deny shelter and support to Great Britain in time of war is too unpatriotic to be even so much as mentioned. But we could not offer her shelter and support without *ipso facto* ourselves declaring war against the enemy. Then Canada is not independent of British wars.

As another argument in support of his general thesis, Mr. Ewart traverses once more the commonplace history that both British and Canadian representatives have sat in recent years on all Anglo-Canadian tribunals for the settlement of British disputes touching purely Canadian interests. He seems to assume that

this history argues the gradual emergence of Canadian separation from Great Britain. This history appears to us, however, to argue directly against Mr. Ewart's contention. So far as we can see it only argues the admission of Canada to a greater measure of responsibility within the Empire, and not in any degree her separation from the Empire. Great Britain and Canada form but one party to the litigation. Indeed, in point of law, Great Britain herself is the only party and Canada is not internationally recognised in the proceedings in any way. From one point of view the controversy may appear to be of purely Canadian interest, but from another, it is primarily of British interest. If the dispute should fail of a peaceful settlement, then all the petty interests of Canada vanish almost completely before the prospect of a British war. The simple fact is that Canadian representatives are appointed to represent Great Britain and to co-operate with the British representatives because Canadians are more familiar with the facts and therefore in a better position to guard both British and Canadian interests and to ultimately arrive at a just and peaceful settlement.

There are many other bonds which bind Great Britain and Canada together in addition to those to which we have already referred. We are even bound to Great Britain fiscally. The British preference was certainly designed to encourage Anglo-Canadian trade, if, indeed, it was not primarily intended to be the first instalment of an all-British customs federation. We are bound, too, to Great Britain by a hundred thousand or more British settlers who come to our shores every year, and who still dream of the homeland. We are bound to Great Britain by common political liberties and common political ideals, as well as by the inexorable obligations of gratitude.

In view, then, of these many