

baum remarks: "Quae quidem conclusio quam arguta, quamque infirma sit, nemo non videt." It is doing Plato gross injustice, however, to father such weakness upon him. We may perhaps be of opinion, that, in winding up his argument, he does not express himself so fully as he might have done; but the reasoning, as he has left it, may have been sufficient for those to whom it was addressed; and, at any rate, he is entitled to a candid and liberal interpretation of his language. What he *should* have said, to render his argument logically complete, is sufficiently obvious. Starting with the simple fact, that, in this life, say L_1 , the soul has in it true opinions capable of being developed into knowledge, he has inferred (c) that the same thing holds good of a previous life, say L_2 . Now, in order that he might reach his grand conclusion, it was only necessary for him to add, that, by a repetition of the reasoning, the same thing could be shewn to hold good regarding a still prior life, say L_3 ; and so on, without limit. The terms L_1, L_2, L_3 , &c., forming an infinite series, carry us back through all time (*παντα χρονον*); and, let us recede into the past as far as we please, we never reach a point where the soul is not in possession of latent true opinions, or, what is involved in this, where it is not found in the condition of having learned (*τον αι χρονον μεμαθηκυια εσται*). This is manifestly what Plato should have said. Is it not what he *has* said? In substance, I believe it is. His statement is exactly to the following effect: *true opinions are in the soul of any one, both while he is a man, and while he is not* [not simply before he became a man, but (*ον αν μη η ανθρωπος*) during all the time when he was not a man, in other words, throughout the whole time that preceded his birth]; *therefore, &c.* The first position here laid down, that true opinions are in a person's soul while he is a man, has been proved by the example of Meno's attendant. The proof of the next position, that true opinions were in the person during the whole of the time when he was not a man, has not indeed been fully drawn out in a formal manner. But having demonstrated (as he conceives himself to have done) that true opinions were in the soul in a life anterior to the present, and having demonstrated this as a corollary from the fact that they are in the soul in the present life, Plato probably thought that his readers would have no difficulty in perceiving for themselves that the same considerations which evince the present life to be the sequel of a preceding, in which the soul had true opinions in it, are