WHAT IS WORTH TO-DAY THE NAVAL ORGANISATION OF GREAT BRITAIN?

"THE BETRAYAL"

The foreign policy of Great Britain and her naval organisation are intimately connected. As above stated, England, in carrying out her policy of intervention, has always "enforced her arguments with the full strength of her Navy." One has only to read the history of England from the time of Elizabeth and Cromwell to be struck with the evidence of that historical truism.

That policy and its effectiveness reached their zenith at the time of the partition of Europe, after Napoleon's downfall. It was Trafalgar more than Waterloo that gave Wellington and Castlereagh the power to dominate the congresses of Vienna and Verona; it was the British fleet more than the British army that gave to Disraëli the means of swaying the Berlin congress.

Is that power on its decline? Does England renounce her right of intervention because she no longer feels strong on high to impose it on all seas?

If such were the case, the coincidence of Sir Edward Grey's speech and of the publication of Lord Char'es Beresford's book would be of a much greater import than the mere interest aroused by the simultaneous transmission of both incidents by the eclectic cable agency; and the above question would instinctively recur to the mind under this more concrete form: Does England renounce her right of intervention, because her fleet and naval organisation are in such a state of disorder as described by Lord Beresford?

The sole title of the lark is sufficient to mark the bitterness of its contents. (In its main parts and criticism, it may be summarised as follows:

The training of navy officers, of engineers especially, is absolutely defective.

The "scrapping" policy adopted in 1904 was so bad that it had to be reversed in 1909. Meanwhile, out of 102

^{(1)—&}quot;THE BETRAYAL" — by Lord Charles Beresford;—P. S. King & Son, London, 1912, 1 vol. 2s. 6d. (\$0.50).